Iraq: The Next Phase

Looks like the next phase involves an Islamic Republic ala Iran.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21909-2003Nov29.html
Cleric Renews Call for Election in Iraq
Sistani Spells Out Opposition to U.S. Plan
By Anthony Shadid and Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, November 30, 2003; Page A01


BAGHDAD, Nov. 29 -- Iraq's most powerful Shiite Muslim cleric said in remarks made public Saturday that he opposed key elements of a U.S. plan for a political transition in Iraq and insisted that a provisional government be chosen through elections, challenging the Bush administration's proposal for relinquishing authority by June.



The statement by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani was made in response to written questions sent to his liaison office in London. While Iraqi politicians had reported elements of Sistani's objections after meetings this week, Sistani had not publicly addressed the proposal, and the remarks represented his clearest statement yet on the plan.

"The mechanism in place to choose members of the transitional legislative assembly does not guarantee the establishment of an assembly that truly represents the Iraqi people," Sistani said in the handwritten response, which bore the stamp of his headquarters in the holy city of Najaf and was sent electronically from his liaison office in English and Arabic.

"This mechanism must be replaced with one that guarantees the aforesaid, which is elections, so the assembly will emanate from the desire of the Iraqi people and will represent them fairly without its legitimacy being tarnished in any way," he said.

Given the influence of the ayatollah, perhaps the most powerful figure in Iraq, the administration and the U.S.-appointed Governing Council may be forced to overhaul the transition plan they unveiled only two weeks ago. But one key figure on the council said Saturday that the plan was not open to negotiation -- a comment that could indicate a looming confrontation with the country's influential clergy.
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Meanwhile, weapons of mass destruction are being proliferated while we whistle Dixie in Iraq.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21879-2003Nov29.html
Smugglers Targeting Dirty Bombs for Profit
Radioactive Materials Are Sought Worldwide
By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, November 30, 2003; Page A01


TBILISI, Georgia -- When police caught up with him on May 31, Tedo Makeria was headed toward Tbilisi's main rail station, his lethal cargo hidden in boxes lined with lead so thick his taxi sagged from the weight. The suspicious policeman who halted the cab had barely cracked the trunk when he noticed the boxes and the distinctive labels that warned, "Danger: Radiation."



More police arrived within minutes, and a Geiger counter was produced. As Makeria smoked nervously in the back seat, the officers flipped the instrument's "on" switch and watched the needle leap off the screen.

"At first we were just shocked," Maj. Leri Omiadze, the ranking officer at the scene, recalled later. "Then we all started backing away slowly."

Inside Makeria's boxes were two capsules of highly radioactive metals -- strontium and cesium -- of a type that terrorism experts say can be used in a dirty bomb, a device that spews radiation but does not trigger a nuclear explosion. A third container held a vial of brown liquid that Georgian police identified as the substance used in mustard gas, one of the earliest chemical weapons. Only later did police learn Makeria's role in the affair. He was a courier for criminals trading in components and materials for weapons of mass destruction.

In a scheme still not fully understood, the boxes were delivered to Makeria by another Georgian, a man with a history of drug offenses. Makeria's job was to carry the boxes by train from Tbilisi to Georgia's Adzharia province, a troubled enclave on the southwestern frontier of the country. From there, police believe, they were to be transported by other couriers across the border into Turkey or perhaps even Iran, for delivery to an expectant customer. The buyer's identity remains unknown.

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I hope this comparison is wrong, cause this doesn't bode well for the future. But it does seems closer to reality than the comparison to Vietnam or Germany used by opponents and proponents of the war, respectively.



http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2003/11/30/MNGQJ3D1061.DTL

NEWS ANALYSIS
Haunting parallels seen between Chechnya, Iraq
Guerrilla warfare, sheltering by civilians plague U.S. and Russia

Anna Badkhen, Chronicle Staff Writer Sunday, November 30, 2003


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Moscow -- Deadly bombings and suicide attacks claim lives daily, casting a pall over efforts to keep the peace. Heavily armed soldiers control little more than the ground they stand on. Anyone cooperating with the authorities becomes a target of elusive insurgents who operate swiftly, easily finding shelter among the civilian population, many of whom seem to be on the rebels' side.

Sounds like the American occupation of Iraq? It could be. But it is also the deadly quagmire Russia has been facing in Chechnya since the Kremlin's latest attempt to subdue the separatist republic began in 1999.

When the high-tech American military was blitzing its way through Iraq's vast desert into Baghdad last spring, confounding all but the most optimistic predictions, a comparison to Russia's nearly 10-year conflict in Chechnya would have seemed preposterous.

But today, with some 130,000 U.S. troops bogged down in a costly campaign against increasingly bold and sophisticated Iraqi guerrillas, the comparison does not seem so far-fetched, say analysts who have been studying Russia's campaign in Chechnya.

"It's amazing," said Sergei Markov, director of the Institute for Political Studies in Moscow. "The Americans are acting in Iraq as if Chechnya never happened, as if there are no lessons to learn."

There are differences between the battlefronts, of course. American forces in Iraq are better equipped, better trained and better paid than the Russians fighting in Chechnya; they have higher morale, nutritious food and sufficient medical care. In Russia, many soldiers -- who often serve for a meager $100 a month or less -- are "routinely denied adequate food and access to medical care," the New York-based Human Rights Watch wrote recently. Even so, American troops are no better at preserving their victories than the Russians are at theirs, said Ivan Safranchuk, director of the Moscow office of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information.

"The Chechens see the Russians and the Iraqis see the Americans as occupiers, not as liberators," Safranchuk said. "Actions against Americans will continue regardless of how Americans behave. It's difficult, but you have to learn to live with the notion that people are unhappy with your presence."

There are other striking similarities between the two conflicts. Russia announced that the war in Chechnya was over when its troops took control of the republic's major cities just a few months after the Kremlin launched the campaign in 1999. Since then, the effort to rein in Chechen rebels has become Russia's bleeding sore. Federal troops, about 80,000-strong, suffer almost daily losses at the hands of insurgents, who kill a dozen Russian servicemen each week in a war that some analysts estimate costs the country more than $2 billion a year.

Russian officials say more than 5,000 Russian soldiers have died in Chechnya since the war began, but soldiers' rights groups believe the real death toll is closer to 11,000. Russians respond to guerrilla hit-and-run attacks by combing through villages as they look for insurgents, often detaining or killing innocent Chechens and making new enemies. In May, the Kremlin said 1,132 civilians were killed in the war in 2002, but advocacy groups in Russia and in the West believe the number is many times higher.

Last month, Chechens elected a candidate hand-picked by Russian President Vladmir Putin, to govern the republic in elections that observers said were rigged. But the new president, Akhmad Kadyrov is reviled by his own people, and his administration appears to be powerless against the insurgents.

In Iraq, too, U.S.-appointed local officials say they are powerless to stop the rebels and often become guerrilla targets themselves. The Iraqi Governing Council, hand-picked by Washington, appears to have little legitimacy with the Iraqi people.

Lightly armed and highly mobile groups of guerrilla fighters -- much like the Chechen rebels -- have been mounting daily attacks against the U.S.

military, killing at least 185 American soldiers since President Bush announced May 1 that the "major combat" in Iraq was over, including at least 79 in November, the deadliest month for U.S. forces since they invaded Iraq in March. According to the Pentagon's latest figures, more than 9,000 U.S. troops have been killed, wounded, or become ill enough to require evacuation since the war began.

The recently-launched "Operation Iron Hammer," aimed at cracking down harder on the guerilla movement, employs jet bombers and other heavy weaponry, like the Russians use in Chechnya, raising the possibility of more civilian casualties and even greater resentment from the Iraqi people.

"Only Americans deal with the resistance, not us. We don't have the power.

This is the problem of the Americans," said Brig. Gen. Riyad Abbas al Karbuli,

police chief of Fallujah, a town 30 miles west of Baghdad that has become a flashpoint of Iraqi resistance to the occupation.

The Bush administration's plan to turn over power to a capable and democratic Iraqi government by next June may prove to be an equally hard task,

say analysts.

"It seems almost certain that the leadership Iraq has on the day the U.S. transfers sovereignty will not survive for more than few years at most unless a new strongman emerges," the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think-tank, wrote in a report last month.

As yet , America's multibillion dollar reconstruction project has not brought the quality of life in many parts of Iraq even to prewar levels. Like many Chechens, many Iraqis are without basic services.

Incidents in which American soldiers mistakenly kill Iraqi civilians overshadow coalition reconstruction efforts. They also alienate Iraqis, some to the point of joining the guerrillas to exact revenge, thus continuing the cycle of violence.

When President Bush made his surprise visit to U.S. troops in Baghdad, he might not have been thinking about a similar trip President Putin made in 1999 to Chechnya, on New Years Eve, Russia's biggest holiday. Such morale-boosting trips may garner some temporary relief from bad news, but they ultimately don't change the underlying dynamics on the ground, say analysts who have studied both conflicts.

"Iraqis will always hate Americans, no matter what Americans do for them, " said Alexei Malashenko, an expert on Chechnya and the Middle East at the Moscow office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "To them, they will always be occupiers."

What the U.S. can avoid in Iraq is committing the kind of atrocities that have brought on international condemnation of Russian soldiers' conduct in Chechnya, Malashenko said. Human rights groups have accused the Russians of torturing, raping and murdering innocent Chechen civilians.

"Don't tease, don't torture the Muslim population," Malashenko advised. "If Americans shoot at demonstrators, if they irritate the locals, then no military equipment in the world will help them."

 

http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1201/p01s01-woiq.html
Attacks turning to US allies in Iraq

A series of ambushes in Iraq this weekend left Spain, Japan, South Korea, and the US mourning the loss of their citizens.

By Nicholas Blanford | Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

BAGHDAD – In response to a two-week crackdown by the US military, Iraqi insurgents are switching tactics from hit-and-run raids against American troops to attacking the coalition's vulnerable allies.
US military officials say that the number of attacks against coalition forces has dropped since Operations Iron Hammer and Ivy Cyclone II began in Baghdad and the volatile Sunni triangle two weeks ago. Yet at least 104 coalition troops died in Iraq in November, 79 of them Americans, making it the bloodiest month since the war began.



The paradox of reduced attacks but increased casualties underlines the difficulties a high-tech conventional army faces when confronting lightly armed but determined guerrilla fighters who hold the initiative, choosing when, where, and how to strike before vanishing into a population increasingly hostile to the US-led occupation. And, analysts warn, the US military's displays of force and intrusive counter- insurgency measures are more likely to further alienate Iraqis rather than deter militants.

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"In the past, attacks against coalition forces were predominant," Paul Bremer, the US overseer in Iraq, said last week. "Now terrorist attacks against Iraqis are occurring regularly. This is a repugnant but not unexpected tactic."
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If this clown *expected* this, our preparation for it was atrocious.

 

More shiite funny business


http://www.latimes.com/news/nationw...3dec03,1,5565182.story?coll=la-home-headlines

THE WORLD
U.S. Resistance to Direct Vote Galvanizes Iraq's Shiite Clerics



By Alissa J. Rubin, Times Staff Writer


NAJAF, Iraq — With a suddenness that seems to have caught American officials by surprise, Shiite Muslim clerics who for decades ministered in the quiet obscurity of the back streets of this holy city are now driving key decisions about the future governance of the nation.

The immediate focal point is a showdown with the American-led coalition over the process for transferring sovereignty to an Iraqi government.

Shiite religious parties, with the backing of the most senior cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, say they favor direct elections for a transitional government rather than the American-backed proposal to use provincial caucuses for selecting delegates to a national assembly.

But beyond this debate, far broader political forces are at work. At stake is the role religious Shiite parties will play in Iraq for the foreseeable future.

The Shiite community, which was brutally persecuted by Saddam Hussein and his Sunni Muslim-dominated Baath Party, would likely benefit from swift direct elections because Shiites make up about 60% of Iraq's population and their religious parties are, at this point, the most organized political force in the country.

But some Bush administration officials fear that if Shiite fundamentalists were to win at the polls, they would advance an anti-Western agenda with a theocratic bent reminiscent of Iran rather than build a relatively moderate democracy that protects the basic rights of all Iraqis, including women and minorities.

The extent to which Shiite clerics end up with a controlling influence after the foreign coalition leaves — and the role of Koranic law in the nation's constitution — might well depend on how Americans handle the current challenge from Shiite leaders.

"Absolutely this is a delicate moment," said a senior administration official who is knowledgeable about Iraq policy. "Do we throw the dice and say, 'This is a political issue, and we're not going to let [Sistani] dictate to us'? Will he be willing to deal or not? It's a turning point."

Observers here note that American opposition to the religious Shiites' agenda puts the U.S. in the odd position of resisting what is arguably the most democratic of processes: a free election. They also worry that the Americans have not carefully considered the worst-case scenarios.

"If the Shiites do not get what they are asking for and Sistani issues a [religious order] forbidding people to vote, no Shiite will participate in the political process," said Jabber Habib, a Baghdad University political science professor. "I don't think that will happen, but the high Shiite clerics have great power if they want to use it."

Three factors seem to have pushed Shiite religious leaders into their current disagreement with the coalition.

First, the conservative clerics are looking ahead to an uncertain political future if the economy improves and the country becomes more Westernized. Consequently, they want direct elections well before drafters of a national constitution are due to be selected, more than a year from now.

Second, some Shiite leaders appear to doubt that the United States has their interests at heart. That concern has been exacerbated, the clerics say, by poor communication between the parties.

Senior members of the coalition dispute that view, insisting that there is regular communication with religious Shiites. A senior staffer noted Tuesday that civilian administrator L. Paul Bremer III had met hours earlier with cleric Abdelaziz Hakim, a member of the Iraqi Governing Council who also leads the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq. However, coalition officials in the provinces say it has been difficult to maintain regular communication.

The third factor is that neighboring Iran, the largest Shiite nation in the world, seems to be pushing a number of Shiite leaders in Iraq to exercise greater political power more quickly.

Iraq's Shiite population encompasses a vast religious spectrum — some are secular, some religiously observant and some in-between. But almost all share a pride in the scholarship and stature of the grand ayatollahs of Najaf, who historically have been rivaled only by those in the Iranian city of Qom.

That pride has swelled in the months since Hussein's overthrow, as even the most secular Shiites expressed admiration for the survival of members of the Shiite religious parties, many freshly returned from exile, and for senior clergy who had remained in Iraq despite the repression of Hussein's rule.

By framing the issue as whether Americans intend to honor the wishes of the Shiite majority, Shiite clerics appear to be capitalizing on the sense of shared identity.

Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, a Kurd who attends many Governing Council meetings and met with Sistani in Najaf this year, warned that issues related to the Shiites' stature would resonate among the majority. "When it comes to these issues, the Shiites have solidarity, regardless of whether they are religious or secular," he said.

Observers believe that the sense of solidarity will ebb if reconstruction efforts succeed.

"The religious parties are afraid that in a year or two, the standard of living will increase and prosperity will increase and the people will not go for these religious parties," said Habib, the professor.

The three best-known Shiite parties are the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the Islamic Dawa Party and a loose group of clerics around Muqtader Sadr, a radical young cleric whose father and cousin defied Hussein's regime and were assassinated for their stance.

None of these groups openly discuss the extent to which each would like religious law to dominate Iraq, but it is an implicit theme in their recent pronouncements on the political process. It is also a theme that frightens many secular Iraqis.

All of the Shiite religious parties have armed followers. But none is as organized as the SCIRI-affiliated militia, which the Americans have been able to only nominally disarm.

Western observers believe that the SCIRI, the dominant political force in Najaf, is trying to expand its power as rapidly as possible. Dawa controls much of the southern city of Nasiriyah, and Sadr holds sway over multitudes in the sprawling Baghdad slum known as Sadr City. Sistani, the most widely revered Shiite cleric in Iraq, has called for an election of the transitional legislature, which would take office by July. The cleric, who is not aligned with any party, is also displeased that the unelected Governing Council, rather than an elected body, will write the interim law for running Iraq that is due to be completed by March, said a senior Iraqi official who met with the cleric.

During Friday's prayers in Najaf, preacher Sadruddin Qubanchi, a high-ranking SCIRI official, accused the Americans and the Governing Council of deception in the way they have presented the process of choosing the transitional legislature.

"It is not going to be done through elections, but through appointments. They are cheating the marja," said Qubanchi, referring to the five most senior clerics who interpret Shiite teachings.

The Shiite parties' determination to consolidate political influence has caused the groups to deny that serious problems could result from early elections.

Coalition officials and secular members of the Governing Council argue that the country is too unstable for fair elections to be held soon because of the risk of attacks on voters and candidates by Hussein loyalists.

Ayatollah Mohammed Ali Yaccoubi, a supporter of Sistani, counters that "the security issue is just an excuse for not holding elections."

"There are several stable provinces, the unstable points are only between 10% and 20%," he said in an interview. "You may not have 100% participation. But a province without elections can say, 'These are our delegates to the legislature,' and pick some."

Privately, two prominent Shiites said that considering that tens of thousands of Shiites were slaughtered by Hussein, any further casualties incurred for the sake of elections in which Shiite parties are assured of doing well would be a small price to pay.

American officials were apparently unsure how to encourage moderate Shiite clerics and discourage the fundamentalists who might lean toward Iran. The result was that they cast their lot with secular Shiite exiles such as Ahmad Chalabi and Iyad Allawi, who lead parties that have only recently begun to put down real roots in Iraq.

Sistani, who met with U.N. envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello before his death, refuses to meet with Bremer. Although Bremer has reached out to some of the moderates, especially in Baghdad, he has few links to the powerful senior clerics in Najaf.

Similarly, there has been no effort on the part of the U.S.-led coalition to talk directly to Sadr. But the coalition makes no apology for that omission. "We absolutely don't want to meet with Muqtader al Sadr. He's accused of some very serious crimes — he's been a force for unrest and strife," an official said.

However, shunning Sadr is seen by the Najaf authorities as a slight to an important clerical family, even though in the main they do not like or trust Sadr, who is viewed by many as a hothead who lacks his relatives' Islamic scholarship.

"The Americans should deal with all symbols of the Iraqi people equally," said Yaccoubi, the Sistani supporter.

Ayatollah Ishaq Fayed, one of the five senior clergy in Najaf, harbors further frustrations. Speaking on his behalf, Sheik Ali Rubaie, who runs Fayed's office, said hundreds of worshipers have come to senior clerics for help after confrontations with the American military.

"We suggested that there should be an American decision maker we could talk to in order to solve the problems, so Iraqis will realize these are friendly troops and not occupiers, but this has not happened. So we have stopped communication with them," Rubaie said.

The military officers who spoke with Rubaie are no longer in Najaf, but a coalition official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the failure to appoint such a person was "probably an oversight."

The Americans counted on Shiite support for their occupation, but it appears that many Shiites view the deposing of Hussein as little more than payment of a long-overdue debt.

After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the Shiites, urged on by the Americans, held off Hussein's forces and ousted the Baathists from several southern strongholds. Triumph turned to tragedy when the U.S. left them to fight alone. Hussein's troops killed tens of thousands, burying them in mass graves.

At a recent book fair in Najaf, a man in a business suit pored over a table of tomes dedicated to the uprising. Eyeing one with a cover photograph of teenage boys marching through Nasiriyah with AK-47s in their hands, he said in English: "They are my son's age. You know who is responsible for their deaths? George Bush, the father."

It is also in places like this book fair, the first one in this city in 35 years, that the subtle influence of Iran becomes obvious.

The fair was opened by the Iranian cleric Mohammed Ali Taskhiri, who spoke on behalf of Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Taskhiri called for an "Islamic constitution," adding, almost as an admonishment, "The Shiite leaders know their responsibilities."

Iran's links to southern Iraq are complex — a combination of family ties, religious fraternity and spilled blood.

Among the fair's best-attended exhibits was a set of tables where visitors could write a letter to Iran's late supreme leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Flocks of men gathered to fill out a piece of paper and hand it to a cleric standing nearby.

"It would be good to have a leader like Ayatollah Khomeini. He delivered Iran from darkness to light," said Saeed Kamal Khaderi, referring to the spiritual force behind Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution. Khaderi, 29, is an agricultural engineer who now works in an air-conditioning repair shop to make ends meet.

"I would prefer a cleric as a leader," he added in a wistful tone. "They are always on the right side."

 

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101031208-552124,00.html

W O R L D
Losing Hearts And Minds
Unmoved by Bush's visit, Iraqis blame the U.S. for civilian deaths, missing detainees and razed homes
By BRIAN BENNETT; VIVIENNE WALT/BAGHDAD



Wednesday, Dec. 03, 2003
Mohammed Ali Karam wants to kill a U.S. soldier. He doesn't love Saddam Hussein, and he was happy in April when U.S. Marines rolled through his Baghdad neighborhood on their way to liberate the capital. But he turned against the Americans the night he saw his brother Hussein, 27, take two bullets in the neck. At 10:30 p.m. on Nov. 17, Karam says, he and three of his brothers were driving to a neighborhood where the pumps were working in order to get water for their home. Hussein, in the passenger seat, talked excitedly about having his new suit tailored for his upcoming wedding. That's when 82nd Airborne paratroopers, crouched in an observation post across the street, opened fire — after rounds struck their position, they say. Three of the brothers ran to the safety of a creek bed, but Hussein didn't make it. In the car, said Karam, the soldiers found Hussein — gurgling blood through his throat — but no weapons. Hussein died on the way to the hospital — three days before his wedding.

U.S. troops face a difficult task in trying to root out the violent insurgents who want to drive them out of Iraq. But in pursuing this deadly enemy, the Americans are frequently guilty of excesses that are turning ordinary Iraqis into foes. Bush's Thanksgiving visit meant little to Iraqis, who cite three areas of concern: the killing of innocents, the "disappearance" of countrymen detained by U.S. forces, and the destruction of buildings, including family homes. The last tactic, justified by U.S. commanders as legitimate demolition of military targets, is criticized by human-rights groups like Amnesty International as smacking of collective punishment. As U.S. forces employ more aggressive tactics to take on the resistance, these grievances are only getting worse, setting back the effort to win over local hearts and minds. "Before the Americans came, we heard a lot about their respect for human rights," says Khalid Mustafa Akbar, at a mourning tent for his three brothers who were shot dead while driving their pickup by a U.S. patrol outside Tikrit last week. "But then we found it is only talk."
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http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/...mand=viewone&op=t&id=96&rnd=933.2558497019061


A Combat Leader Gives The Inside Skinny Of The Biggest Battle Since The War Ended



The convoy which was attacked while driving through Samara was not a supply convoy as reported, but was carrying large amounts of new Iraqi currency to stock local Iraqi banks and US greenbacks used to pay for goods and services the US forces need to accomplish their missions in Iraq. This convoy was heavily guarded by Abrams Tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles. It was akin to a huge Brinks Truck delivery.

The reports of 54 enemy killed will sound great on the home front, but the greater story is much more disturbing and needs to be told to the American Public.

When we received the first incoming rounds, all I could think of was how the hell did the Iraqis (most of these attackers being criminals, not insurgents) find out about this shipment? This was not broadcast on the local news, but Iraqi police knew about it. Bing, Bing Bing, You do the math.

Of greater importance in the scale of the attack and the coordination of the two operations. Iraqi Rebel Guerilla Units elements still retain the ability to conduct synchronized operations despite the massive overwhelming firepower "Iron Hammer" offensive this month.

Hack, most of the casualties were civilians, not insurgents or criminals as being reported. During the ambushes the tanks, brads and armored HUMVEES hosed down houses, buildings, and cars while using reflexive fire against the attackers. One of the precepts of "Iron Hammer" is to use an Iron Fist when dealing with the insurgents. As the division spokesman is telling the press, we are responding with overwhelming firepower and are taking the fight to the enemy. The response to these well coordinated ambushes was as a one would expect. The convoy continued to move, shooting at ANY target that appeared to be a threat. RPG fire from a house, the tank destroys the house with main gun fire and hoses the area down with 7.62 and 50cal MG fire. Rifle fire from an alley, the brads fire up the alley and fire up the surrounding buildings with 7.62mm and 25mm HE rounds. This was actually a rolling firefight through the entire town.

The ROE under "Iron Fist" is such that the US soldiers are to consider buildings, homes, cars to be hostile if enemy fire is received from them (regardless of who else is inside. It seems too many of us this is more an act of desperation, rather than a well thought out tactic. We really don't know if we kill anyone, because we don't stick around to find out. Since we armored troops and we are not trained to use counter-insurgency tactics; the logic is to respond to attacks using our superior firepower to kill the rebel insurgents. This is done in many cases knowing that there are people inside these buildings or cars who may not be connected to the insurgents.

The belief in superior firepower as a counter-insurgency tactic is then extended down to the average Iraqi, with the hope that the Iraqis will not support the guerillas and turn them in to coalition forces, knowing we will blow the hell out of their homes or towns if they don't. Of course in too many cases, if the insurgents bait us and goad us into leveling buildings and homes, the people inside will then hate us (even if they did not before) and we have created more recruits for the guerillas
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Holy cow, some Iraqis support us. One bright spot in the gloom.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37746-2003Dec5.html
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In a show of support for Washington, up to 1,000 Iraqis, including many children orphaned by the war to oust Saddam, marched through Baghdad to protest against violence and to show support for the U.S.-led occupation forces.

It is the second time in two weeks that demonstrators have gathered in significant numbers to back U.S. attempts to rebuild the country.

But anti-American sentiment still runs strong elsewhere in Iraq. Moqtada Al-Sadr, a firebrand cleric who opposes the U.S.-led occupation, threatened a general strike if American forces did not release his followers who have been detained in recent weeks. Sadr gave a deadline of three weeks.
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The Bushies screwed the pooch in Afghanistan.

http://www.msnbc.com/news/1002197.asp?vts=120720031354

Bin Laden’s Iraq Plans
At a secret meeting, bin Laden’s reps give bad news to the Taliban: Qaeda fighters are shifting to a new front

By Sami Yousafzai, Ron Moreau and Michael Hirsh
NEWSWEEK


Dec. 15 issue — During the muslim holy month of Ramadan, three senior Qaeda representatives allegedly held a secret meeting in Afghanistan with two top Taliban commanders. The confab took place in mid-November in the remote, Taliban-controlled mountains of Khowst province near the Pakistan border, a region where Al Qaeda has found it easy to operate—frequently even using satellite phones despite U.S. surveillance.

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The Taliban sources paint a portrait of a Qaeda network that has found new ways to operate, despite a U.S. dragnet in Central and South Asia. U.S. officials adamantly deny they have skimped on resources—intelligence or military—in that region. But there is evidence that the diversion of U.S. attention to Iraq has given Al Qaeda some breathing room, and that U.S. dependence on Pakistani troops and Afghan warlords is proving inadequate, perhaps even counter-productive, against the terror network. Over the past year, NEWSWEEK has learned, the CIA and British intelligence have been at odds over how badly the Taliban and Al Qaeda were damaged in the region. “The British were more prone to say the Taliban and Al Qaeda were coming back,” says a U.S. official who is privy to intel discussions, and who believes the Bush administration downplayed the threat in order to switch its focus to Iraq.

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But if bin Laden’s Taliban allies are to be believed, the Qaeda leader may no longer be sympathetic to their entreaties. It appears that he, like his mortal enemy George W. Bush, may be seeking to make Iraq center stage in the war on terror.