Go for it Snopesters. I think this is legit. Prove me wrong. ******************************** This was sent out to all of us here at Mount Vernon Mills by our company president. Very Interesting to say the least. Thought all of you would like to see this. Dear Friends, Today I attended a luncheon of the Yale Club of Vero Beach. The speaker was Dr. Khidhir Hamza, former head of Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program. His talk was riveting and frightening. It made such an impression on me that I want to pass the essence of it on to you. First of all, I want to thank God that George W. Bush is our President. The facts presented by Dr. Hamza support everything that the Bush administration has said. Iraq has numerous chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. Saddam has been trying since before the Gulf War to develop nuclear weapons and is probably not far from that goal. Hamza got a Master's from MIT and a PhD in Nuclear Physics from Florida State. He was forced to return to Baghdad because of threats to his father and ventually became head of Iraq's effort to build a nuclear bomb. They made considerable progress prior to the Gulf War principally by purchasing technical knowledge and various components from other countries. They paid over $5 billion to Germany for various critical technology that has no peaceful use whatsoever. Surprised that Germany doesn't want to invade Iraq? Our bombs set back their program by several years. We destroyed much of their hardware, but they still had the technology. Saddam has chemical and biological weapons in massive amounts stored in bunkers that he was going to blow up as the allies advanced and blame it on our bombers. He was successful in blowing up one facility that Dr. Hamza suspects could have caused the Gulf War Syndrome that many veterans suffer from. He said there are countless deformed children and an abnormal number of adults suffering from cancer and other afflictions. Saddam couldn't care less about the health of his people. He diverts funds that should go for food, medicine, etc. to building a war machine. The nuclear program has continued unabated since the Gulf War. Everything is well hidden and is highly portable. The inspectors will find nothing. Hans Blix is totally worthless. The inspection teams probably have some competent, motivated people, but they also have spies who alert the Iraqis in advance so they can clean up the target sites before the inspectors get there. The only way to find anything of value is to move the scientists and their families out of the country and get the facts from them. Blix says they are allowed to interview the scientists with no Iraqis present. Brilliant. The Iraqis will know who revealed critical information by the choice of targets to inspect. The scientists and their families will be killed. Unless they are removed from the country, they are not going to give out any information. It would be their death sentence. had hoped that Saddam might see the light and agree to go into exile as several Arab and other countries are trying to get him to do. Hamza claims that Saddam would be killed wherever he goes and that he knows it. I hope he is wrong on this, but I am less hopeful than I once was. The media and other left-wing organizations are claiming that we should drop our pursuit of Iraq and concentrate on North Korea. They have or will soon have nukes and are the greater threat say the pundits. They are holding us hostage. Saddam is trying desperately to get nukes so he too can hold the world hostage. That is why he must be eliminated now. He can be stopped. It is too late to stop North Korea. Hamza is convinced that the people of Iraq will welcome a regime change. Saddam is a ruthless and egomaniacal dictator. The infrastructure of the country is in a shambles. With Saddam out, the oil wealth can be used to rebuild the country. The U.S. will probably have to administer the post-war economy, but we will not have to support it. Hamza pointed out that Iraq has never had a civil war in all its history. The claim that anarchy will reign with Saddam gone is nonsense. The risk in removing Saddam by force is great. The risk in letting him remain is untenable. I think I have covered the main points of the presentation. It is a scary situation, but it is reassuring to know that our government is on top of it and has been presenting an accurate picture right along. Name Witheld by Me
i've heard dr. hamza on the sean hannity show a few times. the guy makes a great case for taking out saddam as i would think many iraqis would.
http://www.yellowtimes.org/article.php?sid=889 Saddam's bombmaker' is full of lies By Imad Khadduri The book "Saddam's Bombmaker," recently published by Khidhir Hamza, recounted the author's 22 years of experience with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC). Hamza exaggerated to a great extent his own role in the nuclear weapon program. As I personally know the author and have worked with him during these two decades, I wish to clarify the following untruths and misinformation that has been postulated by him in his book. There is a huge difference between those who worked with the government for scientific and professional reasons despite being under the sharp sword of government security agencies, and those who try to hide their fear with a fig leaf. A few scientists who believed in their work realized the slippery road they were treading and tried to leave before and after the 1991 Gulf War. While some were able to flee Iraq, others, such as Dr. Al Shahrastsani (who was also charged with other offenses), ceased his work despite the penalty of death given to such rebellious actions. But when the bells of fear first started to ring in Hamza's mind in 1974, when he prepared the first nuclear weapons project report at the request of the government, he decided to stay in Iraq until it was convenient for him to go abroad. In the '70s and '80s, it would have been much easier and less risky to leave, yet he wallowed in Iraq in nice Mercedes cars while attending scientific conventions with lavish stipends. He kept deluding himself, as he naively mentions in his book, that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IEAE) or the CIA would contact him and magically whisk him out of Iraq as if on a flying carpet. Even though he was the head of the physics department in the nuclear research center for ten years during the seventies, his deep inner fear of radiation prevented him from ever entering the reactor hall or touching any scientific gadgets, probably due to his continual fear of an electric jolt that he experienced as a child, as his book mentions. Hamza's aversion to scientific experimentation drove him to insist on working solely on the highly theoretical three-body- problem during the seventies, far removed from any of the initial work on fission that was carried on during that period at the Iraqi Nuclear Research Center. He did not, even remotely, get involved in any scientific research, except for journalistic articles, dealing with the fission bomb, its components or its effects. The testimony to this is the recorded archive of the IAEC for the seventies that point to the efforts of others in this field, and none to the self-proclaimed "bombmaker." At the end of the seventies, he completely refused to take any responsibility in the Iraqi purchased French research reactor, and left that task to the great Egyptian scientist, Dr. Yehya El Meshad, who was assassinated by the Israeli Mossad in Paris in 1980. After he again withdrew from any leadership responsibility for the nuclear weapon project which started in earnest in 1980 in direct response to the Israeli attack on the OSIRAK reactor, leaving it to one of Iraq's great physicists, Hamza was merely assigned the gaseous diffusion project. He did, in fact, spend some effort in buying the fine filters needed for that project, but his fear of entering the project hall was a cause of many hilarious puns. In the mid eighties, Hamza was asked by Hussain Kamil to write a report on the progress of the weapon program to present to the government. In response to this report, the whole program was put under the control and guidance of Hussain Kamil himself in 1987. The pace of work accelerated immensely until 1991. However, during that time, the "bombmaker" was kicked out of the program at the end of 1987 for stealing a few air conditioning units from the building assigned to his project. This he conveniently omitted to mention in his book, but cited frequent travels abroad to garner assistance and equipment, while in fact he was an outcast to the project and did not attend any seminar or brainstorming sessions during that intense period. The "bombmaker" did make a great deal in his book of his role in building the Al Atheer weapon manufacturing center during the late eighties, while in fact he was going in circles doing nothing at the Tuwaitha Research Center, as a mere has-been, and did not even have an office space in Al Atheer. He was, in fact, assigned the peripheral job of writing a report on the American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) project and spent his time collecting whatever information was available in the library from newspapers and scientific journals. He spent all his time during these critical years in the library and, in 1989, was made a sort of consultant, still loosely attached to the IAEA, but also taught at a university two days a week, far removed from any bomb making. In addition, he was thoroughly annoyed and bitter regarding the rejection by the CIA of his appeal for them to take him, through the auspices of the Iraqi National Congress representative in the north of Iraq, where he fled alone, leaving his family behind, in 1994. He pathetically thought that the CIA was not aware of his minuscule role in the bomb making, especially after the weapon program's scientific report fell in the hands of the IAEA inspectors in 1991. He claimed to be the container of secrets while in fact he was only regurgitating them. Worse than that, he claims in his book that the CIA, in 1995, fabricated a story published in an English newspaper of his submitting a report on the supposed continued Iraqi nuclear program just to ferret him out of his hiding place. Being a teacher at that time in a Libyan University is not a place to hide, to say the least. The extent of his fear climaxed when the Iraqi government sent his son to Libya to persuade him to return. He repulsed his son's appeals and again scrambled to Europe, knocking desperately at the doors of the IAEA and the CIA, who again gave him the cold shoulder. But then, it is most probable, the CIA reconsidered his case in the light of the escape of Hussain Kamil to Jordan and his revelation of yet more hidden technical reports at his chicken farm in Iraq. The CIA thus hoped that Hamza might fill in some small gaps on information and took him under their wings, helping him and his family to settle in the U.S. under their protection and strings. I can only recall the image of "the bombmaker" straggling for two decades during the seventies, eighties and early nineties with his tail between his legs, looking over his shoulders and running to whomever gave him a piece of bone with some meat on it, to then suddenly springing from his cocoon at the end of the nineties as a Don Quixote with an American mask. Brandishing his wooden sword in the small arena afforded to him by the CIA, he counted on the silence of his colleagues, either out of fear of the Iraqi security agencies or the blind cruelty of the American ones, to not expose his phony claims in his book, which may be rendered as a repayment to the CIA for their services to him. His appearances on the weekly American talk shows are truly a reflection of his present allegiances. The reader might question the motive of my writing on this sensitive subject and the personal tack apparent in it. All I can say is that even if silence is gold, then not speaking out at this time against such fallacies is a stigma of cowards. [Imad Khadduri has a MSc in Physics from the University of Michigan (United States) and a PhD in Nuclear Reactor Technology from the University of Birmingham (United Kingdom). Khadduri worked with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission from 1968 until 1998. He was able to leave Iraq in late 1998 with his family. He now teaches and works as a network administrator in Toronto, Canada.] Imad Khadduri encourages your comments: imad.khadduri@rogers.com
Sure, why not? His opinion may still be factually correct. BTW, I suspect that not a few of the Iraqi defectors hate Saddam. Should we question their objectivity too? Or are we blindly looking for evidence to support the current theory the Bush Admin is pushing?
you're showing your colors...you want us to put more faith in Saddam than we do Bush. That's not the case at all. He's saying we have two defectors: (1) Guy who hates Saddam. He says Saddam has nuke capability. (2) Guy who hates Guy #1. He says #1 is lying. People challenge #2's credibility based on bias, but accept #1's credibility, presumably because it fits what we want to hear. The CIA has said there's no evidence that Iraq has nuke capabilities. Accepting #1's comments and dismissing #2's is basically only accepting evidence that fits with the theory you really want to believe. It fits along the idea that if you start with the premise you're right and dismiss anything that doesn't fit, you're probably going to conclude that you're still right.
Your company President said : "First of all, I want to thank God that George W. Bush is our President" ?
That's one of your weaker posts Major. Just because No Worries speculates that many (generic) defectors hate Saddam, you assume Guy #1 now hates Saddam? I question Guy #2's credibility because he speaks with contempt about Guy #1. To ignore that, and accept his statements at face value is foolish. His statements may be accurate, but more information is required to make a reasonable assessment. I made NO comments regarding Guy #2's claims because I am ignorant of his background and his claims (including whether or not he hates Saddam )
<b>Major</b> Do you consider <a HREF="http://www.yellowtimes.org">Yellowtimes</a> and Imad Khadduri to be credible sources?
No doubt. That's whay I also said 'I made NO comments regarding Guy #2's claims because I am ignorant of his background and his claims '.
Major Do you consider Yellowtimes and Imad Khadduri to be credible sources? I know very little about either of them. I'm not judging the credibility of either statement. I was simply responding to the claim that No Worries was: wanting "us to put more faith in Saddam than we do Bush." I do believe all these defectors will have agendas. People who defect are motivated by various things - some ideological, which will give the best information. Others might simply want to get in good with the US, in which they made simply say what they think the US wants to hear. Others may have a beef with the government or whatever. I know nothing about the background of any of these people, but I think its odd that people dismiss defector that doesn't fit what we'd like to hear (this happens on both sides).
I question the credibility of Imad Khadduri and <a HREF="http://www.yellowtimes.org">Yellowtimes</a> and I did the research to document it. I didn't have to search very hard for the Khadduri/Yellowtimes link that I use because it was posted in this BBS thread: <a HREF="http://bbs.clutchcity.net/php3/showthread.php?s=&threadid=52025">Iraqi Defector Talks!!!</a> at <b>02-17-2003 03:08 PM</b>. <a href="http://www.yellowtimes.org/article.php?sid=874">Iraq's nuclear non-capability</a> <i>.......In 1996, Hussain Kamil, who was in charge of the entire range of chemical, biological and nuclear programs, announced from his self-imposed exile in Amman that there were hidden caches of important documentation on his farm in Iraq. (Apparently, he had had his security entourage stealthily salvage what they thought were the most important pieces of information and documentation in these programs.) The U.N. inspectors pounced on this and a renewed string of confrontations occurred, until the inspectors were asked to leave Iraq in 1998..........</i> <a HREF="http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/resolution949.htm">UNSCOM: CHRONOLOGY OF MAIN EVENTS</a> <i>..........8 Aug 1995 General Hussein Kamel, Minister of Industry and Minerals and former Director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation, with responsibility for all of Iraq's weapons programmes, leaves Iraq for Jordan. Iraq claims that Hussein Kamel had hidden from UNSCOM and the IAEA important information on the prohibited weapons programmes. Iraq withdraws its third biological Full, Final and Complete Disclosure and admits a far more extensive biological warfare programme than previously admitted, including weaponization. Iraq also admits having achieved greater progress in its efforts to indigenously produce long-range missiles than had previously been declared. Iraq provides UNSCOM and the IAEA with large amounts of documentation, hidden on a chicken farm ostensibly by Hussein Kamel, related to its prohibited weapons programmes which subsequently leads to further disclosures by Iraq concerning the production of the nerve agent VX and Iraq's development of a nuclear weapon. Iraq also informs UNSCOM that the deadline to halt its cooperation is withdrawn..........</i> <a href="http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/chronology.html">IAEA Chronology of Main Events</a> <i> .....7 Aug 1995 Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel defects to Jordan. 12 Aug 1995 Iraq invites IAEA to send delegation to Baghdad. 17-20 Aug 1995 IAEA High Level Delegation in Iraq. Revelations confirming extensive clandestine nuclear weapons program indicate need for complete revision of FFCD. 17 Aug 1995 Iraq admits having planned to use safeguarded HEU for weapon. Crash Program designed to overcome lack of fissile material production. 20 Aug 1995 Iraq hands over document cache to UNSCOM & IAEA. Iraq releases information allegedly withheld on Hussein Kamel's orders without the knowledge of the Iraqi government. Haider House Farm cache consists of more than 500,000 pages of documents. 22 Aug 1995 IAEA discussions with Hussein Kamel in Jordan. 9-20 Sep 1995 IAEA 28. Follow up investigation of information provided after Hussein Kamel's defection. Need for new FFCD restated.....</i> <a HREF="http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9509/iraq_defector/kamel_transcript/">Transcript of part one of Correspondent Brent Sadler's exclusive interview with Hussein Kamel (September 21, 1995)</a> I could continue with more links illustrating that 1995 was the correct year The defection of Hussein Kamel in <b>1995</b> was a <b>seminal and very well known event</b> in the Iraq inspection chronology and for Imad Khadduri to get it wrong makes it hard to believe his other points. <a HREF="http://www.yellowtimes.org">Yellowtimes</a> didn't catch the error either and it makes me wonder how much they really know about the subject.
The dilligent reader will now realize that Mango has introduced Guy #3. Guy #1: Imad Khadduri Guy #2: Khidhir Hamza Guy #3: Hussein Kamel Mango is suggesting that since Guy #1 did not get one of his facts right about Guy #3, how could you trust his opinion of Guy #2. This crippled logic would force all of us to never believe another word from any politician, like GWB, Powell, Cheney, Rumsfeld, et al. BTW Mango, I think yellowtimes published Guy #1's articles/op ed pieces uncensored and unchecked, leaving it to the reader to determine what they will.
<A HREF="http://www.yellowtimes.org/article.php?sid=874">Iraq's nuclear non-capability (by Imad Khadduri) </a> <i>...........Last month, a group of journalists was taken on a guided tour of a "possible" uranium extraction plant in Akashat in western Iraq. The Iraqi guide pointed to the obviously demolished buildings and asked tongue-in-cheek, "Who would make any use of these ruins? Maybe your experts would tell us how." ........</i> I was wondering where Imad's media quote about the ruins at Akashat came from. I fed this into a google search box: <a href="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&safe=off&q=Akashat+Who+would+make+any+use+of+these+ruins">Akashat who would make any use of these ruins</a> <b> Results: </b> <a HREF="http://onegoodmove.org/1gm/1gmarchive/000431.html">Iraq's nuclear non-capability (Reprinted From Yellow Times)</a> <a HREF="http://www.dissidentvoice.org/Articles/Khadduri_IraqNuke.htm">Iraq's Nuclear Non-Capability An Insider’s View by Imad Khadduri</a> <a HREF="http://www.thetruthseeker.co.uk/article.asp?ID=314">Iraq's Non-Nuclear Capability By Imad Khadduri - YellowTimes.org</a> <a HREF="http://www.palestinechronicle.com/article.php?story=2002112419270380">Claims on Iraq’s Nuclear Capability Ridiculous (by Imad Khadduri)</a> <a HREF="http://www.dailystar.com.lb/opinion/10_12_02_c.htm">Opinion article</a> that results in a 404 (File not Found). <a HREF="http://www.redress.btinternet.co.uk/ikhadduri.htm">Spotlight Former Iraqi nuclear scientist speaks out By Dr Imad Khadduri</a> <a HREF="http://www.arabia.com/newsfeed/article/english/0,14183,339982,00.html">Claims on Iraq's Nuclear Capability Ridiculous (By Imad Khadduri)</a> Everything points back to Imad Khadduri as the source of the quote that he supposedly got from elsewhere. I am still looking for the source of his media quote. Perhaps you could provide it for us. <a HREF="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/unscom/experts/defectors.html">Robin Wright on Kamel's Defection</a> <i>....<b>What was revealed in Kamel's defection?</b> Kamel's defection led to two important disclosures. One was the information he provided Western intelligence agencies. But, secondly, Saddam Hussein knew that he was about to be caught, and so he took weapons inspectors down to Kamel's chicken farm, and said that they'd only just discovered these containers full of documents about weapons of mass destruction. Of course, feigned his own ignorance, and blamed it all on Kamel......</i> <a HREF="http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/03/02/time/inspections.html">Uncovering Iraqi Intrigue</a> <i>.......The Iraqi government tried to portray Kamel as a lone rogue who was himself concealing records; they thus led U.N. investigators to a Kamel-owned chicken farm, where they found more than a million pages of documents on Iraq's banned weapons programs. "The chicken-farm documents gave us a clear indication of how much we had missed," says UNSCOM deputy executive chairman Charles Duelfer..........</i> <a HREF="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/iraq/stories/unscom101198c.htm">Rare Victories</a> <i>.........The shock came with the defection of Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law. Kamel's revelations forced Iraq to "discover" 1.5 million new pages of weapons research documents at a chicken farm owned by Kamel. Still, the disclosures did not lead to the core of what UNSCOM sought. Internal evidence showed that Iraq had removed the most important documents. In ballistic missile files, for example, Iraq turned over component drawings made during development but not the "integration drawings" – the only ones necessary to resume production. In a grim Baghdad headquarters of Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate, the bureaucracy set up to shadow UNSCOM's inspections, Ritter tried to question Iraqi officials about the missing documents on May 5, 1996. Hossam Amin, a top official, read him a prepared statement. All he knew was that a girlfriend of Hussein Kamel – Kamel was married to Saddam Hussein's daughter, Raghad – had phoned Amin after Kamel's defection to say some boxes of "important things" were stored at the chicken farm. She hung up without giving her name. Iraq, Amin said, had now told everything it knew about the documents and would not answer further questions. The "girlfriend story," as it came to be known in UNSCOM, was seen as preposterous. A few months later, on Aug. 16, Amin told Ritter to "forget this, as it never happened," according to notes made by another participant in the interview. Amin had been under instruction to terminate the conversation, he admitted, so he made the story up. He then provided a new explanation, more complex but equally implausible...........</i> Those three articles read quite differently than the Imad Khadduri article at yellowtimes. <a HREF="http://www.yellowtimes.org/article.php?sid=874"> ''Iraq's nuclear non-capability''</a> <i>........In 1996, Hussain Kamil, who was in charge of the entire range of chemical, biological and nuclear programs, announced from his self-imposed exile in Amman that there were hidden caches of important documentation on his farm in Iraq. (Apparently, he had had his security entourage stealthily salvage what they thought were the most important pieces of information and documentation in these programs.) The U.N. inspectors pounced on this and a renewed string of confrontations occurred, until the inspectors were asked to leave Iraq in 1998....</i> A google search of <a HREF="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&q=Imad+Khadduri">Imad Khadduri</a> is yielding roughly 1270 links at the moment. Most all of the early links (+100) refer to his articles at the yellowtimes and are what I view as alternative news sites..........but interviews and mentions from sources such as CNN, Washington Post, NY Times etc are lacking. I have read several articles about Iraqi nuclear weapons programs and don't recall seeing his name mentioned in any of them. You have yet to post anything beyond the yellowtimes articles to substantiate Imad's claims.
Mango, You could always email Imad Khadduri and ask your questions of him directly. You never know he just might reply.
