The Wolf Who Cried Wolf in Sheep's Clothing By William Saletan Updated Tuesday, April 1, 2003, at 2:53 PM PT 2:50 p.m.: On Saturday, at a checkpoint near Najaf, Iraq, four American soldiers stopped a man who appeared to be a taxi driver. His car exploded, killing them all. Iraqi officials later said the man was an Iraqi military officer. On Sunday, a contract worker at a U.S. Army camp in Kuwait, allegedly having locked his colleagues in a trailer, drove a pickup truck into 13 American soldiers. On Monday, at a second checkpoint near Najaf, a car approached a group of U.S. Marines. According to the Pentagon, the driver ignored warning shots. Fearing another suicide attack, the Marines fired into the car. Afterward, inside the vehicle, they found more than a dozen women and children, most of them killed by the Marines' weapons. What's the moral of the story? Let's consult the expert, Aesop. In the Wolf in Sheep's Clothing, he wrote: A wolf found great difficulty in getting at the sheep owing to the vigilance of the shepherd and his dogs. But one day it found the skin of a sheep that had been flayed and thrown aside, so it put it on over its own pelt and strolled down among the sheep. The lamb that belonged to the sheep, whose skin the wolf was wearing, began to follow the wolf in the sheep's clothing; so, leading the lamb a little apart, he soon made a meal off her, and for some time he succeeded in deceiving the sheep, and enjoying hearty meals. In the Boy Who Cried Wolf, Aesop told a different tale: A shepherd-boy, who watched a flock of sheep near a village, brought out the villagers three or four times by crying out, "Wolf! Wolf!" and when his neighbors came to help him, laughed at them for their pains. The wolf, however, did truly come at last. The shepherd-boy, now really alarmed, shouted in an agony of terror: "Pray, do come and help me; the wolf is killing the sheep"; but no one paid any heed to his cries, nor rendered any assistance. The wolf, having no cause of fear, at his leisure lacerated or destroyed the whole flock. Separately, each fable makes sense: Watch out for wolves dressed as sheep, and don't commit serial deception, or people will stop believing you. But what happens when the two stories merge into one? What happens when the serial deception consists of wolves dressing as sheep? What if people begin to suspect not that every boy who cries wolf is lying, but that every sheep is a wolf in sheep's clothing? That's what's happening in Iraq right now. According to multiple witnesses, many Iraqi soldiers are dressing as civilians, shooting from houses, traveling in civilian cars, using pedestrians as shields, and firing artillery from residential neighborhoods. In the first Najaf incident, they began to use a tactic that Iraqi officials promise to exploit further: disguising themselves as civilians to commit suicide bombings. They're making British and American soldiers afraid that every sheep could be a wolf in sheep's clothing. The danger raised by this serial deception isn't that the Brits and Americans won't believe it when a wolf is coming. The danger is that they won't believe it when a sheep is coming. In the fable of the boy who cried wolf, the deceiver pays the price. But in the twisted version unfolding in Iraq, only the victims and dupes suffer. More civilians die, because U.S. and British troops have trouble distinguishing them from disguised soldiers. And outrage against the invaders grows, because nobody blames the wolves who dressed as sheep on Saturday or Sunday for the sheep who were mistaken for wolves on Monday. That's the moral of the story: When scrutiny is reserved for the other side, crime pays. Monday, March 31, 2003 1:15 p.m.: On Saturday, Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan issued the following statements about Iraqi military methods and targets: 1) "We will use any means to kill our enemy in our land, and we will follow the enemy into its land." 2) Arabs should "turn every country in the Arab world into a battlefield, not only against those who wear the military uniforms of the United States and the United Kingdom, but against all who support them." 3) "If the B-52 bomber can kill 500 people at one time, I am sure that our operations by freedom fighters will be able to kill 5,000 people." At face value, these statements dispense with months of debate over covert, indirect Iraqi sponsorship of terrorism. Iraq, represented by its third-highest ranking official, now embraces terrorism openly and directly. Any regime that threatens to "use any means to kill," "follow the enemy into its land," "kill 5,000 people" at one time, and take the battle to "all who support" American and British troops—not just "those who wear the military uniforms"—is implicitly targeting civilians. By any definition, that's the essence of terrorism. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441, adopted unanimously last November, threatened Iraq with "serious consequences" based on Resolution 687 of 1991. Paragraph 32 of Resolution 687 required Iraq "to inform the Security Council that it will not commit or support any act of international terrorism … and to condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism." Paragraph 33 stipulated that a cease-fire of the Persian Gulf War was contingent "upon official notification by Iraq … to the Security Council of its acceptance of the provisions above." In other words, if Iraq violated its pledge to renounce terrorism, it would void the cease-fire and renew the war. As permanent members of the council, France, Russia, and China voted for Resolution 687. So did Belgium, which held a rotating membership on the council at the time. All of which raises two questions. To the government of Iraq: How can Vice President Ramadan's statements be reconciled with your obligations under Resolution 687? And to the governments of France, Russia, and China: If the statements can't be reconciled with the resolution, will you honor the resolution and rejoin the war? Thursday, March 27, 2003 12:45 p.m.: The Gulf War second-guessers are back. Shiites in southern Iraq haven't welcomed U.S. or British troops as advertised, and the second-guessers think they know why. Shiites are "still aggrieved over then-President George H. W. Bush's encouragement of an uprising in 1991 and his subsequent refusal to support it," says the Washington Post. Robert Bartley of the Wall Street Journal claims we could have avoided the current mess by aiding the Shiites back then. London Independent columnist Donald MacIntyre argues that the Shiites are right to lie low, "given the US abandonment in 1991 of the uprising [Americans] had called for." Gerard Baker of the Financial Times asks, "How many of the Shias … watched as relatives and friends were taken off to be executed once their last US incited uprising had been quelled. And how many blame it on American perfidy?" For those of you who don't play competitive Scrabble, perfidy means treachery. The charge is that the Shiites shouldn't trust us because we broke our promise. That's exactly wrong. The promise we made in the Gulf War was to stay out of Iraq, and we kept it. That's why people should trust us now when we promise to get rid of Saddam Hussein. U.N. Security Council Resolution 660, adopted on Aug. 2, 1990, defined the objective toward which the Security Council subsequently authorized military action in the gulf. It demanded that Iraqi forces withdraw "to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990." No resolution prior to or during the war authorized the U.S.-led coalition to invade Iraq. In March 1991, a few days after Saddam's troops fled Kuwait, U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney was asked whether the coalition would go into Iraq to "stabilize" it. Cheney acknowledged the unrest in southern Iraq but warned, We are reluctant as a government and as a coalition to get into the business of internal Iraqi politics. We could have set, as an objective of the coalition, the toppling of Saddam Hussein's government. We did not do that. … It would be very difficult for us to hold the coalition together for any particular course of action dealing with internal Iraqi politics, and I don't think, at this point, that our writ extends ... to trying to move inside Iraq and deal with their internal problems. This wasn't just prudent, Cheney argued; it was a matter of trust. The coalition's mandate had been established months earlier in Resolution 660 and in discussions with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia about hosting the coalition's troops. As Cheney described it, When the President offered to send forces, King Fahd agreed, and he did so on the basis that he knew he could trust the United States of America; that we would come, we would keep our word, we would bring enough force to be able to roll back Saddam Hussein's aggression, and that when we were no longer needed or no longer wanted, we would leave. ... It was that element, I think, of trust that played very prominently in the willingness of so many nations to tie their own circumstances and policies to those of the United States. In view of that understanding, Bush had no business promising to send troops into Iraq to assist a Shiite uprising. And in fact, he didn't. Three weeks into the war, Bush observed, "There's another way for the bloodshed to stop, and that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside, and then comply with the United Nations resolutions." That was a fact and a suggestion, no less true or wise than an equivalent remark about the Cuban or Serbian people. But it wasn't a promise. We couldn't promise the Shiites we would enter Iraq, since we had already promised our coalition partners we wouldn't. We made a deal. The deal was to limit the mission. Without that deal, we wouldn't have gotten U.N. support or possibly even an adjacent staging ground. You can't praise Bush in one breath for assembling that coalition and fault him in the next for not "going to Baghdad." You can't accuse the United States of treachery for staying out of the 1991 uprisings. And you can't say we'd have more credibility now if we'd gone in then. Credibility doesn't come from doing what seems, on second thought, a nobler thing. It comes from doing what you said you'd do. Last time, we said we'd stop at the Iraqi border, and we did. This time, we said we'd finish off Saddam, and we will. Believe it.
Good to see that Nate Thayer at Slate didn't get confused for a wolf. You could say he was lucky that the Iraqi's kicked him out on Friday, rather than Saturday. http://slate.msn.com/id/2080432/entry/2080434/
Great read... I'm glad to see someone doing his homework... Moral...Who can you trust if you can't trust yourself... Those SOB's will be using human shields and residing in schools and hospitals, but of course, the US and UK will be blamed for going to extreme measures to maintain its safety...
Bottom line: For the Vast Majority of Americans, we agree with what we are doing, got what we wanted so stop whining! CIVILIANS DIE IN WAR! it sucks,it is horrific, but it is reality. We wanted war, we got it.
I don't want to see innocent people die anymore than anyone else does, but why can't some people understand the simple point brought out in Will's article? I get tired of hearing people basically say, "If the United States wouldn't have invaded Iraq, this kind of thing wouldn't happen." No, Saddam would probably find another way to kill some of them. I may not know the motivation of some people in this war, but I can tell you why I support it--and it's not oil. I really do want to see the people of Iraq out from under the thumb of Saddam. And I don't believe any amount of diplomacy was going to get the job done.
I want the Middle East to experience democracy, and let it spread like wild fire to lesson the hold of radical theocrats and corrupt rulers, that exist all over the M.E. now. DD
And when you say that, someone in the region will say, I hope the corruption of western rulers and dirty governments learn that democracy doesn't work (e.g. protesters/whole gore-bush conflict)
Wrong. There are quite a few things that contribute to our military power more than our democratic system. It wasn't too long ago that the USSR could incinerate the planet just as easily as the US. And since when did the goal of democracy become power?
Will's article, though well written, is an unusual defense of both Bush administrations' wars. He starts with the obvious that suicide bombers and soldiers dressed as civilians increase innocent civilian causalties. This is not put into any sort of historical context but is thrown out as a generic indictment of Iraqi barbarism. He then argues because one Iraqi official, who has been subjected to a couple of weeks of intense bombing and watching Iraqi civilians die, has finally said Iraqis should see to it that Americans are killed, including civilians, that this somehow proves that Iraq supports terrorism and that therefore we were right to start the war. What can I say. The ex post facto statments of this official though deplorable, are laughable if given to prove that Iraq has always supported terrorism against Americans and therefore the war was justified. I would hope a better argument for the war exists. Next Will creatively invents a justification for Bush Senior's encouragement to the Shia of the South to rebel and then not supporting them. Bush is portrayed as having promised the UN or allies that he would make no attempt to overthrow Sadam, and that though it was tough to watch the slaughter of the Kurds and Shia he was an honorable man of his word had to stick with it. This sticking to his word is also praised as this honorableness led to valued UN approval. Left unsaid is why UN approval was not so valued this go around. Bush senior provided several rationales for this inaction at the time and I would argue that if Bush Senior is really so much a man of his word we should accept his own statments and not this new argument on Will's part. Bush, Powell, Rumsfeld, Cheney were widely quoted as saying that they thought overthrowing Sadam would create chaos in Turkey and throughout the Middle East. It was widely reported that way at the time. It was also stated that given this downside to taking Baghdad our generals thought that it would take too many US lives to actually take Baghdad. I'll portray this incident differently by citing an article. One should note the 30,000 Shia deaths but try to visualize these as Americans so that one can understand their significance and why the Shia did not rise to greet us as liberators. ***************************** ***************************** Southern Iraq's Shias are being urged to rise up against Saddam. But Dan De Luce hears how the US failed them in their hour of need 12 years ago Wednesday April 2, 2003 The column of Iraqi army soldiers looked exhausted and broken. They were in retreat, making their way north from a humiliating rout in Kuwait. "Even the Republican Guard was demoralised. They were holding two fingers down, signalling defeat," said Sayed Nour Battat, recalling the closing days of the 1991 Gulf in his home town of Basra. "The soldiers were desperately looking for something to eat. They offered their weapons in exchange for civilian clothes," Battat said. "Suddenly, there were a huge number of guns in ordinary people's hands. With those weapons, we had the power to change things. " Sensing Saddam Hussein was losing his grip, the Shia Moslems of southern Iraq seized their moment in 1991 in an "intifada" that erupted across southern cities in a spasm of violence and chaos. Twelve years after that failed rebellion, Britain and the United States are hoping for Shias in Iraq to rise up again. But the scars from the last attempt run deep, and Shia exiles say they will never forgive Washington and its allies for standing by while Baghdad exacted merciless revenge. Speaking in the ancient holy city of Qom in Iran, where many Iraqi veterans of the uprising have settled, Battat and other exiles recalled the day that Saddam Hussein's regime looked on the verge of collapse. In Basra, armed with the Kalishnikovs they got from hungry soldiers in retreat, Shias took to the streets. "The anger had been boiling for years and years and it finally exploded. Everyone came out on the street. There were about 30,000 people," Battat said. The crowd stormed the Baath party headquarters. "That was an ominous place for us. That's where the secret police would interrogate and torture people. I was afraid just to look at that building." After a gun battle in which at least four Baath party officials were killed, the people of Basra took back control of their city. "I was so happy, because that building was such a symbol of terror." On the radio, Battat and his family heard the leader of the most powerful country in the world, President George H.W. Bush, call for a revolt against Baghdad: "There's another way for the bloodshed to stop, and that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands, to force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside, and to comply with the United Nations resolutions and then rejoin the family of peace-loving nations." Believing they had the support of the victorious US-led forces, the people of Basra held a meeting to discuss how to run the city. Elsewhere, Shias were attacking Baath party officials and freeing prisoners as rampant looting broke out amid rumours of atrocities against Baghdad collaborators. Like other army conscripts, Abu Abdin deserted his military police unit when he heard rumours of an uprising and travelled back to his family in Nasiriya. "My brother and I were walking in the city centre and some of our friends came up to us and told us that we're going to fight the regime," Abdin said. "We were fighting for freedom. Just freedom." The battle for Nasiriya's police station and army intelligence offices lasted two days. Abdin's 16-year old brother was killed in the fighting. "I travelled to Najaf to bury my brother and I saw that the uprising was gaining momentum there as well." After he returned to Nasiriya, Iraqi Republican Guard and security forces soon launched a massive counter-attack. Assuming Baghdad's air force was grounded by the US-led coalition, the rebelling Shias were stunned when they saw Saddam's helicopter gunships flying towards them. "We managed to shoot one down but we were outgunned. Those helicopters were too much for us because we only had rifles and rocket-propelled grenades," said one veteran of the Badr Corps who fought north of Basra. "We weren't expecting help from the Americans but they helped Saddam's regime by letting him use his helicopters." About three miles outside of Nasiriya, US and allied forces had seized control of a military airport. "That air strip was in the Americans' hands but they just watched what was happening and didn't do anything," said Abu Ahmad Sharifi, who joined the uprising in Nasiriya. Iraqi army T-72 tanks and helicopters blasted Basra and Nasiriya and other cities, forcing the collapse of the improvised militia that had briefly seized 14 of 18 provinces. "With such heavy shelling from the Iraqi army, we couldn't hold the city any longer," Sharifi said. Thousands of men from Nasiriya fled in the direction of the air strip held by US troops. "The Americans had blocked the road with a checkpoint and thousands of us were disarmed. They made us hand over our rifles. We tried to tell them what was happening. "We cannot forget what the Americans did, they took away our weapons and left us to be slaughtered like lambs." Overwhelmed by tanks and helicopters and threatened by a potential chemical weapons attack, tens of thousands of Shias rushed to the border in panic, knowing they faced lethal reprisals if they stayed behind. Some did not make it out. "My nephew was executed in Nasiriya for taking part," said Sharifi. Other Iraqi Shias recount how Baath party agents systematically killed anyone suspected of participating in the uprising or related to those who did. In Basra and Nasiriya, some victims were placed in a ring of car tyres and burnt to death, they said. "My uncle saw corpses on the streets of Basra four days after the executions," Battat said. "There were many people who are still missing." After the uprising in Nasiriya, Abdul Abdin was arrested for having deserted his army unit. "I was imprisoned for a month. When I came out, I saw a corpse that had been left in the street and was half-eaten by dogs. This was what they did to show what happens to anyone who rebels." At least 30,000 died in the uprising, according to the most conservative estimates. The legacy of the failed uprising and its bloody aftermath casts a long shadow over today's "Operation Iraqi Freedom", and the post-Saddam peace it envisages. Those who took part in the uprising are contemptuous of the governments now encouraging them to rebel once again. "The Americans didn't want to help us because we are Shias," said Abudi. "Why are you inquiring about this now 12 years after it happened? Who brought Saddam to power?" · Mohammad Esmaeil Amini contributed to this article http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,928121,00.html
Since no one else mentioned this, we are now officially using churches and schools for military purposes... http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0404/p07s01-woiq.html
Saddam: Bush made me a terrorist. Osama: Yeah, bud, the other guy with the same name did that to me too.
