http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/30/o...89&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink [rquoter]Op-Ed Contributor A War We Just Might Win By MICHAEL E. O’HANLON and KENNETH M. POLLACK Washington VIEWED from Iraq, where we just spent eight days meeting with American and Iraqi military and civilian personnel, the political debate in Washington is surreal. The Bush administration has over four years lost essentially all credibility. Yet now the administration’s critics, in part as a result, seem unaware of the significant changes taking place. Here is the most important thing Americans need to understand: We are finally getting somewhere in Iraq, at least in military terms. As two analysts who have harshly criticized the Bush administration’s miserable handling of Iraq, we were surprised by the gains we saw and the potential to produce not necessarily “victory” but a sustainable stability that both we and the Iraqis could live with. After the furnace-like heat, the first thing you notice when you land in Baghdad is the morale of our troops. In previous trips to Iraq we often found American troops angry and frustrated — many sensed they had the wrong strategy, were using the wrong tactics and were risking their lives in pursuit of an approach that could not work. Today, morale is high. The soldiers and marines told us they feel that they now have a superb commander in Gen. David Petraeus; they are confident in his strategy, they see real results, and they feel now they have the numbers needed to make a real difference. Everywhere, Army and Marine units were focused on securing the Iraqi population, working with Iraqi security units, creating new political and economic arrangements at the local level and providing basic services — electricity, fuel, clean water and sanitation — to the people. Yet in each place, operations had been appropriately tailored to the specific needs of the community. As a result, civilian fatality rates are down roughly a third since the surge began — though they remain very high, underscoring how much more still needs to be done. In Ramadi, for example, we talked with an outstanding Marine captain whose company was living in harmony in a complex with a (largely Sunni) Iraqi police company and a (largely Shiite) Iraqi Army unit. He and his men had built an Arab-style living room, where he met with the local Sunni sheiks — all formerly allies of Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups — who were now competing to secure his friendship. In Baghdad’s Ghazaliya neighborhood, which has seen some of the worst sectarian combat, we walked a street slowly coming back to life with stores and shoppers. The Sunni residents were unhappy with the nearby police checkpoint, where Shiite officers reportedly abused them, but they seemed genuinely happy with the American soldiers and a mostly Kurdish Iraqi Army company patrolling the street. The local Sunni militia even had agreed to confine itself to its compound once the Americans and Iraqi units arrived. We traveled to the northern cities of Tal Afar and Mosul. This is an ethnically rich area, with large numbers of Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens. American troop levels in both cities now number only in the hundreds because the Iraqis have stepped up to the plate. Reliable police officers man the checkpoints in the cities, while Iraqi Army troops cover the countryside. A local mayor told us his greatest fear was an overly rapid American departure from Iraq. All across the country, the dependability of Iraqi security forces over the long term remains a major question mark. But for now, things look much better than before. American advisers told us that many of the corrupt and sectarian Iraqi commanders who once infested the force have been removed. The American high command assesses that more than three-quarters of the Iraqi Army battalion commanders in Baghdad are now reliable partners (at least for as long as American forces remain in Iraq). In addition, far more Iraqi units are well integrated in terms of ethnicity and religion. The Iraqi Army’s highly effective Third Infantry Division started out as overwhelmingly Kurdish in 2005. Today, it is 45 percent Shiite, 28 percent Kurdish, and 27 percent Sunni Arab. In the past, few Iraqi units could do more than provide a few “jundis” (soldiers) to put a thin Iraqi face on largely American operations. Today, in only a few sectors did we find American commanders complaining that their Iraqi formations were useless — something that was the rule, not the exception, on a previous trip to Iraq in late 2005. The additional American military formations brought in as part of the surge, General Petraeus’s determination to hold areas until they are truly secure before redeploying units, and the increasing competence of the Iraqis has had another critical effect: no more whack-a-mole, with insurgents popping back up after the Americans leave. In war, sometimes it’s important to pick the right adversary, and in Iraq we seem to have done so. A major factor in the sudden change in American fortunes has been the outpouring of popular animus against Al Qaeda and other Salafist groups, as well as (to a lesser extent) against Moktada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. These groups have tried to impose Shariah law, brutalized average Iraqis to keep them in line, killed important local leaders and seized young women to marry off to their loyalists. The result has been that in the last six months Iraqis have begun to turn on the extremists and turn to the Americans for security and help. The most important and best-known example of this is in Anbar Province, which in less than six months has gone from the worst part of Iraq to the best (outside the Kurdish areas). Today the Sunni sheiks there are close to crippling Al Qaeda and its Salafist allies. Just a few months ago, American marines were fighting for every yard of Ramadi; last week we strolled down its streets without body armor. Another surprise was how well the coalition’s new Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams are working. Wherever we found a fully staffed team, we also found local Iraqi leaders and businessmen cooperating with it to revive the local economy and build new political structures. Although much more needs to be done to create jobs, a new emphasis on microloans and small-scale projects was having some success where the previous aid programs often built white elephants. In some places where we have failed to provide the civilian manpower to fill out the reconstruction teams, the surge has still allowed the military to fashion its own advisory groups from battalion, brigade and division staffs. We talked to dozens of military officers who before the war had known little about governance or business but were now ably immersing themselves in projects to provide the average Iraqi with a decent life. Outside Baghdad, one of the biggest factors in the progress so far has been the efforts to decentralize power to the provinces and local governments. But more must be done. For example, the Iraqi National Police, which are controlled by the Interior Ministry, remain mostly a disaster. In response, many towns and neighborhoods are standing up local police forces, which generally prove more effective, less corrupt and less sectarian. The coalition has to force the warlords in Baghdad to allow the creation of neutral security forces beyond their control. In the end, the situation in Iraq remains grave. In particular, we still face huge hurdles on the political front. Iraqi politicians of all stripes continue to dawdle and maneuver for position against one another when major steps towards reconciliation — or at least accommodation — are needed. This cannot continue indefinitely. Otherwise, once we begin to downsize, important communities may not feel committed to the status quo, and Iraqi security forces may splinter along ethnic and religious lines. How much longer should American troops keep fighting and dying to build a new Iraq while Iraqi leaders fail to do their part? And how much longer can we wear down our forces in this mission? These haunting questions underscore the reality that the surge cannot go on forever. But there is enough good happening on the battlefields of Iraq today that Congress should plan on sustaining the effort at least into 2008. Michael E. O’Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Kenneth M. Pollack is the director of research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings.[/rquoter]
it appears certain things have changed there...some for the better, relatively speaking of course. But this topic is so 2 weeks ago. DId you hear gonzales?!?!
Isn't NYTimes trash and lies according to you Basso? Or is it only trash and lies when it doesn't suit your point of view?
The really smart, serious, credible Iraq experts O'Hanlon and Pollack (updated below) What is the most vivid and compelling evidence of how broken our political system is? It is that the exact same people who urged us into the war in Iraq, were wrong in everything they said, and issued one false assurance after the next as the war failed, continue to be the same people held up as our Serious Iraq Experts. The exact "experts" to whom we listened in 2002 and 2003 are the same exact establishment "experts" now. Hence, today we have yet another Op-Ed declaring that We Really Are Winning in Iraq This Time -- this one in the NYT from "liberal" Brookings Institution "scholars" Ken Pollack and Mike O'Hanlon. They accuse war critics of being "unaware of the significant changes taking place," proclaim that "we are finally getting somewhere in Iraq, at least in military terms," and the piece is entitled "A War we Might Just Win." The Op-Ed is an exercise in rank deceit from the start. To lavish themselves with credibility -- as though they are war skeptics whom you can trust -- they identify themselves at the beginning "as two analysts who have harshly criticized the Bush administration's miserable handling of Iraq." In reality, they were not only among the biggest cheerleaders for the war, but repeatedly praised the Pentagon's strategy in Iraq and continuously assured Americans things were going well. They are among the primary authors and principal deceivers responsible for this disaster. Worse, they announce that "the Bush administration has over four years lost essentially all credibility," as though they have not. But let us look at Michael O'Hanlon, and review just a fraction of the endless string of false and misleading statements he made about Iraq and ask why anyone would possibly listen to him about anything, let alone consider him an "expert" of any kind: First, this is not the first time O'Hanlon took a trip to Iraq (for what Sen. Webb recently called the "dog and pony show") and then came back and announced How Great Things Are, that We Have the Right Strategy, and that We are Winning. From an NPR Interview, September 28, 2003: LIANE HANSEN: Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution. He just returned from a Pentagon-sponsored visit to Iraq and he's in the studio. Welcome back, Michael. What's it like in Iraq? MICHAEL O'HANLON: Well, it's obviously tough. It's a little better, however, than I thought for a couple of reasons. One is I think the counterinsurgency effort is going fairly well. Now obviously, you mention the number of attacks per day that continue; it's a real concern. We're still losing troops. Everyone's aware of that. The truck bombings in August were tragic. The assassination of the Governing Council member was tragic, but overall, the counterinsurgency mission seems to be going well in that we are taking out a lot more people than we're losing and I believe we're using force fairly selectively and carefully on balance. There's some mistakes here and there. Also, security is pretty good in most of the country despite the fact that it's not good everywhere and that we certainly hear the reports of violence on a daily basis. HANSEN: You say it was better than you thought. What were the surprises? Were there any? O'HANLON: I would say that the main surprise for me was probably that one could travel around the country, even flying over contested areas, with relatively confident sense of security. There wasn't as much need to avoid certain areas as I might have expected. There is obviously violence. There was violence in some of the regions that we visited on the days we were there. But you're talking about specific, isolated acts just like you would get in an American city. I'm not trying to say that this is a country at peace, but overall, we really do run most of the country together with our Iraqi partners and the resistance forces are very small pockets who operate only at a given moment here or there. . . . HANSEN: The Defense Department this past week announced the mobilization of 10,000 soldiers from the Army National Guard. The Bush administration has been trying to get countries—actually, mainly trying to get countries to sign up for peacekeeping responsibilities. Is the contingent, do you think, of the 160,000 American and British troops in and around Iraq sufficient? O'HANLON: My impression is it's roughly sufficient. I would probably go a little higher. But the bigger problem is just sustaining that number is going to be very hard, and that's the reason we have to call up more National Guardsmen. And, just incidentally, despite heralding his Recent Trip to Iraq, as though that demonstrates he really knows what is going on "on the ground," this is what it consists of: HANSEN: Final question. Your visit was sponsored by the Defense Department. Are you concerned that you perhaps were given a rather narrow view of the country by your hosts? O'HANLON: There's no doubt. But we only had a couple days there. We talked primarily to American officials. However, we could be quite prying and we could really push them. And I think overall, nonetheless, I was reassured. We didn't meet a lot of Iraqis who could tell us how things were going, but on balance, I think we had some access. At roughly the same time, he wrote a report about his field trip to Iraq and decreed: But the Iraqis we met were nonetheless grateful for the defeat of Saddam and passionate about their country's future. Their enthusiasm, and their desire to work together with U.S. and other coalition forces, warmed the heart of this former Peace Corps volunteer. Maybe that is why, on balance, I couldn't help but leave the country with a real, if guarded and cautious, feeling of optimism. Also in September, 2003, O'Hanlon published another progress report which revealed all the happy news in Iraq: How can we really determine if the Iraq mission is going well? . . . To convince a skeptical public about progress in Iraq, the Bush administration would do well to provide more systematic information on all of these and other measurable metrics routinely -- even when certain trends do not support the story it wants to sell. The administration should want to do this, because on balance the Iraq mission is going fairly well . . . But most indicators are now favorable in Iraq . . . . As for Baathist remnants of Saddam's regime, they are diminishing with time as coalition forces detain and arrest them. For example, in the region north of Baghdad now run by General Ray Odierno's 4th infantry division, some 600 fighters have been killed and 2,500 arrested over recent months.. . . . Around Tikrit, Saddam's hometown, and other parts of the northern "Sunni triangle," for example, former regime loyalists have been sufficiently weakened that they need reinforcements from other parts of Iraq to continue many of their efforts. Most Baathists from the famous "deck of cards" are now off the street; many second tier loyalists of the former regime are also being arrested or killed on a daily basis. . . . In these counterinsurgency operations, American troops are following much better practices than they did in Vietnam . . . . Coalition forces and other parties were slow at times to anticipate such tactics, resulting in excessive vulnerability to the kinds of truck bombings witnessed in August and the kinds of assassination attempts that just took the life of a member of the Governing Council, Akila al-Hashimi. But these mistakes are being corrected, and future such attacks are unlikely to be as devastating. That sure is a real harsh critic of Bush's war management there. While virtually all of these "liberal hawk" war proponents try to salvage their own reputations by pretending that their Glorious War was ruined by Bush's "terrible mismanagement," that is not what O'Hanlon was saying back then. In fact, O'Hanlon testified (.pdf) before the House Armed Services Committee in October of 2003 and titled his report "A Relatively Promising Counterinsurgency War: Assessing Progress in Iraq." After acknowledging a few "mistakes" -- the Mission Accomplished Speech and Cheney's excessively "rosy" language -- he proclaimed: In my judgment the administration is basically correct that the overall effort in Iraq is succeeding. By the standards of counterinsurgency warfare, most factors, though admittedly not all, appear to be working to our advantage. While one would be mistaken to assume rapid or easy victory, Mr. Rumsfeld's leaked memo last week probably had it about right when he described the war as a "long, hard slog" that we are nonetheless quite likely to win. . . . That said, on the prognosis of Iraq's future, the Bush administration is at least partly and perhaps even mostly right. Negative headlines need to be quickly countered with good news, of which there is an abundance. . . Most of Iraq is now generally stable . . . . [T]he state of affairs in Iraq and recent trends in that country do not look so disconcerting. Things are getting gradually better even as we progress towards an exit strategy that could further diffuse extremist sentiment. On April 9, 2003, he published a piece for the Brookings Daily War Report entitled "Was the Strategy Brilliant?" -- in which he struggled with the deeply Serious question of whether Don Rumsfeld's strategy was unprecedentedly brilliant or merely mind-blowingly smart: Two weeks ago, when the U.S.-led campaign against Saddam Hussein's regime seemed to be bogging down, Secretary Rumsfeld defended the coalition's war strategy. Though keeping some distance from it himself, describing it as General Frank's plan rather than his own, he described it as excellent. General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, went one step further, calling the overall concept "brilliant." Others who had seen it admired its simplicity and its flexibility. Three weeks into the war, with the conflict's outcome increasingly clear, it is a good time to ask if General Myers was right. Will war colleges around the world be teaching the basic coalition strategy to their students decades from now, or will the conflict be seen as a case in which overwhelming military capability prevailed over a mediocre army from a mid-sized developing country? On balance, this victory will be primarily due to the men and women and technology of today's U.S. and U.K. armed forces. Our military is so good that it probably could win this war even with a poor strategy—though many more people on all sides might die in such a hypothetical case. That said, there have been major elements of military creativity in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Whether the overall concept deserves to be called brilliant is debatable. But it does appear to have been clever in several specific ways, most notably in the special operations campaign of the war's early days and in the recent battles for Basra, Baghdad, and other cities. . . . None of this is to claim that the war is over just yet. And of course, victory is coming at a significant human cost; largely for that reason, the broader strategic benefits of this war may be less clear-cut than the battlefield successes. But military historians are already getting ready to put pen to paper, especially to discuss the role of coalition special forces as well as the coalition's urban-warfare techniques. On balance, Secretary Rumsfeld's description of the overall war plan may be more judicious than General Myers. But it has indeed been a very good plan. On April 30, 2003, O'Hanlon went to The Baltimore Sun and wrote gleefully about how Dick Cheney could mock the ex-general war critics because Cheney had been so vindicated: Much of the controversy centered on whether the Army was perhaps a division or division and a half short of the force that it should have had. In my judgment, it was a bit short -- but the problem never threatened the basic integrity of the war plan. As such, former military officers such as retired Gen. Barry M. McCaffrey may have overstated their points when criticizing the war plan. At times they sounded as if they thought the sky was falling. . . . Vice President Dick Cheney had a nice rebuttal to the retired officers when he understandably, and humorously, took a moment to gloat shortly after Baghdad fell. Teasing the pundits "embedded in TV studios," he took his fair shot at them during a speech to newspaper editors and then moved on. That would have been the right thing for Mr. Rumsfeld and General Myers to do, too. More worship for Rumsfeld and his strategy -- which O'Hanlon now tries misleadingly to claim he opposed -- spilled out of his pen in the Japan Times on June 19, 2003: Tip your cap, at least halfway, to Rumsfeld; despite his initial ideological blinders on the subject, he is keeping the postwar U.S. presence strong enough to get the job done as it becomes clear that the job will be hard. Right as the war was about to begin, O'Hanlon was hardly objecting to the strategy. Quite the contrary, he was writing what could only be called adolescent war p*rnography. From The Financial Times, March 18, 2003: Another camp fears Mogadishu writ large -- a scenario like that experienced by US troops in Somalia in 1993 on a vastly greater scale. But both the cakewalk and quagmire predictions are probably wrong. . . . However, the Mogadishu debacle will not be repeated, even if elite Iraqi forces fight hard . . In all likelihood, the war will culminate in a battle for Baghdad starting anywhere from five days to two weeks after bombs begin to fall. The war could be over within a month . . . Hardest to predict is how vigorously Iraqis will fight after their command structure is shattered in this urban blitzkrieg. The block-by-block fighting could be intense in places. But most likely, no more than a few tens of thousands of Mr Hussein's elite troops will wage war once cut off from his authority. US-UK losses could number in the high hundreds or even low thousands, but the battle for Baghdad will almost surely not last more than a week or two. And its hero will be the American and British soldier, not fancy technology or awesome battle plans. The very level-headed, Serious National Security Scholar was saying things like this to America as the Bush administration made its case for war, from The Washington Times, December 31, 2002: While the President decides whether to march to Baghdad, Saddam Hussein may be poised to bring the battle to American cities via terrorism. Yet Washington's focus on creating a new Department of Homeland Security has left America's cities not much better protected than they were sixteen months ago. "Saddam Hussein may be poised to bring the battle to American cities via terrorism." Wow. That's Scary. And Very Serious. As one of the most visible "liberal foreign policy experts," at the "liberal serious think tank," O'Hanlon became one of the most enthusiastic cheerleaders for the war, evidenced by this Washington Times column from February 5, 2003: Yet, the president was still convincing on his central point that the time for war is near. Even those of us who have questioned the case for war over the last year, and who do not buy all of the Bush administration's arguments for invasion even today, need to face the fact that there soon will be no other plausible option. Since his U.N. speech of Sept. 12, 2002, Mr. Bush has adopted a firm but patient Iraq policy. Overruling hardliners in his administration who favored war without further inspections or U.N. debate, Mr. Bush also elected to use multilateral channels to insist that Saddam disarm or be disarmed. Alas, Saddam is not eliminating his banned weapons of mass destruction voluntarily, and hence we soon will need to lead a military coalition to do the job ourselves. The case is that simple. In taking this basic approach, Mr. Bush heeded the counsel of multilateralists, including Secretary of State Colin Powell, the elder President Bush, Brent Scowcroft, James Baker, Tony Blair and many Democrats. It is now time for multilateralists to support the president. So, as we decide now what to do about Iraq, we should definitely look to Michael O'Hanlon to guide us. His judgment has proven to be so reliable, his reports about the war so trustworthy and credible, and the course he advocated so wise and constructive. And he is so very objective, because it isn't as though his entire reputation depends upon avoiding failure in the War he urged. He is one of our Very Serious Experts and if he says -- especially after returning from 8 days in Iraq -- that Things are Going Well and We are Winning, why would anyone doubt him? UPDATE: Like clockwork: Hugh Hewitt: "The authors have just returned from a trip to Iraq, and they saw what everyone else has seen -- noteworthy progress . . . By all means, read the whole thing. If the left has lost Brookings. . . " Powerline: "These are basically the same observations that most visitors to Iraq have made lately. Yet, some think this piece is significant, because of who wrote it -- two liberals from Brookings -- and the fact that it appeared in the Times." Michelle Malkin's Hot Air: "This NYT article is significant both for what it says, and for who is saying it." And on and on. UPDATE II: O'Hanlon on February 17, 2004: "Coalition and Iraqi security forces will ultimately defeat the rejectionist remnants of the Ba'ath Party, as well as foreign terrorists who have entered the country. These dead-enders are few in number and have little ability to inspire a broader following among the Iraqi people." O'Hanlon on March 19, 2004: That said, there is plenty of reason for hope, and much going right today in Iraq as well. . . . Central Command now estimates the number of hardened insurgents at 3,000 to 5,000. It has also suggested coalition forces are killing or arresting more than 50 insurgents a day, a total up considerably since Mr. Hussein's capture in December. (Indeed, only 10 individuals from the original 55 on the famous "deck of cards" remain at large). At that pace, one might think the war should be won by summer. . . .Overall, the glass in Iraq is probably about three-fifths full. Considering the growing strength of Iraqi security services and the fact that $18 billion in American money (as well as a few billion more from other foreign donors) is beginning to flow into Iraq, it is likely to get somewhat fuller soon. Even as O'Hanlon began expressing increasing concerns about instability in Iraq, it was almost always tempered with rosy overall assessments, such as this, from May 16, 2004: While the overall situation is disconcerting, there is still hope -- especially if the standard for success is defined realistically as an absence of civil war, a gradually improving economy, and slowly declining rates of political and criminal violence. The scheduled transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi caretaker government on June 30 may at least begin to defuse the growing anti-American anger that is helping fuel the insurgency. And most American assistance, tied up in bureaucratic red tape until now, should begin to jump-start Iraq's economy in the coming months, with a likely beneficial effect on security as well. As the failure of the war became manifest in late 2004 and into 2005, O'Hanlon began acknowledging the problems in Iraq but blamed the "administration's strategy," even though he was a constant defender of that strategy and did not object to it until the war failed. That is what Serious Experts do -- advocate plans and then blame everyone else when they fail, including those whose "plans" they cheered on at the time. -- Glenn Greenwald http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/index.html
By the way basso, how's that Tillman case of Executive privilege working? http://bbs.clutchfans.net/showthread.php?t=132820
you seem heavily invested in the surge not working, and the war ending up a defeat. one wonders why...
I'm invested in reality. You should try it sometime. It's not as fun as your fantasy world, but you'd feel better about yourself.
Please. You think there are people here who hate Bush so much that they would rather their country suffer than Bush look good? You think there are people who would love to see hundreds or thousands more deaths because it makes Bush look bad? You think there are people who think it's OK to make the world worse for their kids so long as Bush gets no credit? That's just ridiculous... and your MO is getting really old.
One wonders why you continue to believe people with no credibility who have been wrong time and time again, while putting down and doubting those that have turned out to be correct in their concerns and analysis time and time again regarding Iraq. Why is that? That also reminds me that you have yet to answer the question posed to you in this thread. The two are related. http://bbs.clutchfans.net/showthread.php?p=3053061#post3053061 I think it would be interesting to see your answers.
the insistent impulse to downplay, dispute, discredit, or otherwise reject any news from iraq that might be interpreted as positive. vide rimmy's first post in this thread.
He doesn't need evidence. He lives in the same dream world as the Administration he carries water for. In that "reality," all you need are accusations, innuendos, and an aversion to facts.
IOW, the impulse to use facts and available evidence rather than simply believing the same people who have been crowing over our "victory" since 2003.
The insistent impulse to downplay, dispute, discredit, or otherwise reject any news from Iraq that might be interpreted as negative or disagreeing with the Bush Administration. To the extent of calling people traitors for having a differing opinion. That would be the Administration, and that would be you. D&D. Impeach Bush and Cheney.
Iraq is not some wonderland where wishing makes it so. If you want us to hear some positive news from Iraq, then post some real positive news, not just regurgitations of discussions with hand-picked sources in the Green Zone written up by cheerleaders for the administration. For instance, you could tell us about the great success we're having with the infrastructure repairs in Iraq... like electricity. What, oh right, the administration has quit providing information on that topic...
Basso...please define "working" http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070730/ts_nm/iraq_dc_11 Iraqi parliament adjourns in blow to Bush By Mariam Karouny 2 hours, 1 minute ago BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Iraq's parliament went into summer recess for a month on Monday after political leaders failed to agree on a series of laws that Washington sees as crucial to stabilizing the country. Lawmakers said the government had yet to present them with any of the laws. The parliament had earlier signaled its intention to go into recess in August after cutting short its summer break that normally starts in July. "We do not have anything to discuss in the parliament, no laws or constitutional amendments, nothing from the government. Differences between the political factions have delayed the laws," Kurdish lawmaker Mahmoud Othman told Reuters. The parliament is due to reconvene on September 4, just two weeks before the top U.S. general in Iraq, General David Petraeus, and Washington's envoy to Baghdad, Ryan Crocker, are due to report to Congress on the success of U.S. President George W. Bush's new Iraq strategy and make recommendations. The recess leaves Bush with little to show Americans after sending nearly 30,000 more troops to Iraq to give Iraqi leaders breathing space to reach a political accommodation. "Bush cannot realistically go to Congress and say he has to keep U.S. troops there because the Iraqi government is doing a good job -- because the government is largely absent. It places him in a very difficult predicament," said Gareth Stansfield, an analyst at leading British think-tank Chatham House. Petraeus said commanders felt they would need a substantial force in Iraq at least until mid-2009. "Sustainable security is, in fact, what we hope to achieve. We do think it will take about that amount of time ... to establish the conditions for it," he told ABC News. Washington has pressed the Iraqi government to speed up passage of laws that include measures to distribute Iraq's oil reserves and ease restrictions on former members of Saddam Hussein's Baath party serving in the civil service. It views such laws as key to reconciling disaffected members of Iraq's Sunni Arab community, once politically dominant under Saddam and now locked in a vicious sectarian conflict with majority Shi'ites that has killed tens of thousands. A U.S. embassy spokesman said that during parliament's recess it was important Iraq's leaders "remained actively engaged on key legislation and trying to reach agreement on the sticking points." MOUNTING PRESSURE "In the absence of political agreement there was not much the parliament could have done. We will wait for the summit, which is expected to be next week," said a senior Iraqi government official, referring to a planned crisis meeting of the country's top Sunni Arab, Shi'ite and Kurdish leaders. "We have a serious crisis but there are serious efforts to resolve it," the official said, adding that the constitution allowed for parliament to be recalled from its summer break. Cabinet approved the oil law, twice, but it has gone no further. It has been mired in disputes over how much authority regions and central government should have over oil reserves. Easing the ban on Baathists faces stiff opposition from Shi'ite political parties, who fear a resurgence of Baathists who ruled the country for 35 years. Sunni Arabs say they are the main victims of the ban and are being targeted unfairly. Bush is under mounting pressure from Democrats in Congress and rebels within his own Republican Party to begin pulling out U.S. troops soon. The April-June quarter was the costliest in American lives since the start of war in 2003, with 331 killed. The U.S. military reported the deaths of three more soldiers on Monday, taking the death toll since the invasion to 3,651. A preliminary White House assessment earlier this month faulted Iraqi leaders for failing to enact the laws, but analysts say Shi'ite Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's government -- a brittle coalition of Shi'ites, Sunnis and Kurds -- is paralyzed by infighting. Ministers loyal to fiery Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr have pulled out of Maliki's government, while the biggest Sunni bloc in parliament, the Accordance Front, is threatening to do the same this week if certain demands are not met. A car bomb killed six people in a mainly Shi'ite area of Baghdad, ending a brief lull in violence, while Iraqis reveled in their soccer team's Asian Cup triumph.
