Hot wars are massively more expensive than oversea deployments and the deployments you mention actually ensure the dollar as the worlds currency so in a roundabout way they do sort of pay for themselves. I realize at this point in the history of mankind, there will be open and horrific conflict in the Middle East and there is no conceivable resolution yet existing. Mostly because the factions involved don't want any peaceful resolutions, they have proxy backers that are not directly effected, large populations of uneducated youth with no prospects for a future, a deep seated religious bias for intolerance, and no history or tradition of governance other than the divine and absolute.
good plan, how long do you propose on baby sitting with your troops and resources there for. Because it's obvious you can't end the root of the problem and it will continue on the second you leave. And operating bases in Korea and Japan is totally comparable to operating military basis in Iraq right?
It wouldn't have been significantly different in 10 years or so had we stayed. Things were calming down and starting to stabilize before we ran off and the whole region went into chaos again. The root of the problem in Iraq is that there is no powerful authority holding the region together so small BS groups like ISIS can run rampant and take territory. Again, the adults left the room before the kids grew up so they went nuts.
Pope Francis calls for Armed Response to defend Christians from Genocide You know a situation is bad when a pope calls for an armed response. Pope Francis, widely appreciated as a practical and realistic man, is not just calling for a cease-fire or negotiations. Instead, he is inviting an armed response to the terrorism of the Islamic State. Such a call is virtually unprecedented for a pontiff in modern times, but our age is an extraordinary one and the Islamic State has no interest in a bargaining table. Instead, the Islamic State is bent on genocide and barbarism, ruthlessly exterminating anyone who opposes them. On Sunday, Pope Francis said he held "dismay and disbelief" over what is happening in Iraq. He called the Islamic State fighters terrorists and said there was a need for "a professional, well-equipped army." "The situation is going from bad to worse," he warned. Full Story: http://www.catholic.org/news/international/middle_east/story.php?id=56510 When was the last time a pontiff called for a "professional, well-equipped army" to go somewhere and fight someone? Has it happened since the Crusades? Seriously, I don't know, but can't think of any examples off the top of my head. These guys are pure evil, and if we don't so something the problem will not remain contained - it will eventually spill overseas. When even one of the world's greatest pacifists sees this, how much room is there really for debate? How do you take an honest look at these people, what they want, what they are doing, and NOT come to the conclusion that fighting them is the only sane option?
No argument there. I've said repeatedly that early on in the civil war had we done something such as supplying weapons - even using air power - to aid the rebels might have had a positive effect. Assad might have been toppled, moderates might have formed a government, but that possibility evaporated several months into the conflict. Had our leadership acted and not dithered early on something might have been done, but... We know what happened. Nothing. Agreed. But we did nothing when it counted. Lost opportunity. If they had the capability that would be great. You might not have noticed, but so far they aren't doing too well against ISIS. I'd say it's only the second quarter right now, but I'd put the score at ISIS 65 / Iraq 35. They're heading for a blowout unless something changes. That something is our policy. Why do I have to keep repeating myself? We've been over that at least a dozen times. That is correct. So why bother doing it? That is my point. Yes, so again - why do it? No, burt denying them half of their playing field would have limited their options. They have used one arena to enhance their capabilities and grow in the other - back and forth. Their gains in Syria fuel their operations in Iraq, and their gains in Iraq fuel their operations in Syria - back and forth, back and forth. That's how they grow. My point is that had we stayed on their a$$es in Iraq it's unlikely that they would have been able to develop the strength they have in Syria. They have been unchecked on two fronts, checking them on one would have weakened them on the other. Why do you keep saying that? I have repeatedly said that there were timetables involved. One war at a time. No, you set goals - and with hard work and some luck you achieve them. If your withdrawal gets pushed back a couple of years, that's war. But it beats the crap out of simply retreating and then having to return later on to fix the mess you made. That's a dumb question. No one stays anywhere indefinitely in the military - and no one would.
And rocketsjudoka - let me clarify on the last section, since you claim I've been "sidestepping" it... You asked: " Would you personally be willing to continue serving in Iraq indefinitely?" I said it was a dumb question, and it is as phrased. I personally got out for family reasons, so my answer is No, but I am not willing to stay anywhere indefinitely, and no one in the military would. When people PCS, deploy, or move around there are always either timetables involved or, at the least, a plan in the service member's head as to when they plan on leaving. They can request to move - or stay - as well. You don't get sent to South Korea for your entire career, for example; you do rotations there.And in my personal experience as a Guardsman, you get sent where you get sent for a temporary, time-limited deployment, otherwise you live where you want. But if you're really asking "Do I think that having an indefinite presence in Iraq is a good idea" - which is what you're really asking, I think - then that is a legitimate question. And my answer to that is Yes, with qualifiers. Take the casualty levels of 2011 as a baseline. Att the end of 2010 roughly 50,000 troops were in Iraq from all services. We lost 54 service members that year to combat, auto accidents, illness, suicides, and everything else under the sun. For those without a calculator, that means each troops odds were roughly 1000 to 1 of dying - from any cause - that year. Those are ridiculously good odds, even better than most peacetime gigs. Of course, some jobs are more dangerous than others, but it evens out. The Pentagon wanted to keep a minimum of 5K to 10K (and preferably a bit more if they had their way, obviously) troops there - just enough to combat a severely decimated AQI, maintain leverage over Maliki, and keep the Iranians at bay. Such a presence also would have allowed us to maintain the capacity to rapidly surge additional forces into the area if necessary to deal with an emergency situation - sorta like we're seeing now. (Imagine what 15-20K US troops could do against ISIS now? A single MEU or Army brigade could probably ripe a gaping hole through them in pretty short order) So let's consider a force of say, 10K troops from all services, probably 5K Army, 3.5K Air Force, 1K USMC, and some USN and USCG thrown in for good measure. Consider casualty figured still running roughly the same; even elevate them if you want Double the figures from the 2011 baseline. You'll end up with 10-20 troops dead per year. If that force manages to keep Iraq stable, keep AQI in check (and prevent ISIS from becoming what they are), the cost-benefit situation is pretty clear. And those casualties go down even further if the situation stabilizes even more. Also keep in mind that even in peacetime, the military sustains a decent number of casualties due to training accidents, auto accidents, illness, and suicides. It's the price of doing business for the military. But you need to understand that to put the hypothetical casualties into context. So. Assume it takes on the fairly normal structure for an "indefinite" duty post like Germany, S. Korea, or Japan. Honestly, it would probably more resemble Kosovo. Most people will rotate in and out on a continuous basis, some will stay for multiple years, most would do a 1 year deployment and then come home. You'd likely be sending over whole line units to do the footwork, but some units would probably be permanently stationed there, and people would just rotate in and out - like Korea. I really fail to see how different this would be from some of the arrangements we already have with other nations. If you are talking about an indefinite station in an environment such as was there in 2005-2007 then NO - I do not think that would be a good idea, because that would be basically a permanent presence in a combat-type mission. But if you are talking about a 2009-2011 type environment, then you are really talking about a peacekeeping mission with some occasional contact, and that would be manageable. Of course, the question is "for what end" ultimately. To me, coasting out a manageable situation until the locals are able to handle it on their own is a good strategy - and what the Pentagon and most serious people wanted. Instead, we left when the Iraqis clearly weren't ready to handle the situation on their own. We didn't leave because the situation was too terrible to stay, we didn't leave because too many people were dying, we didn't leave because it cost too much. We left because campaign promises needed to be kept in order to win the nest campaign. And now we are back because reality has forced us back, just as many - myself included - warned that we would be. And we are in a much worse position now than we could have been had we chosen more wisely. Understand, I hold Bush and his team responsible for their mistakes in Iraq - and there were many - but he isn't in charge anymore, and he passed off a fairly manageable situation to his successor. Obama and his team have made some monumental mistakes just as the Bush team did. We can point fingers all day long, but the truth is that they all messed up and made royal miscalculations that cost lives and treasure. We can "what if" the situation to death, I can make up fantasy worlds where we stayed and defeated AQI utterly, and then went on to unify the region in peace under a flag of tolerance and freedom and Jews kissed Palestinians in the streets of Gaza and all lived happily ever after, but truthfully it's worth less than the toilet paper I'm going to use tomorrow morning to wipe my a$$ with. What are we going to do now? That is the only question that's worth anything at this point.
Just some numbers to look at to support my argument: You can look at all defense casualties by year and type here: https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report_by_year_manner.xhtml Note that while casualties were plummeting in Iraq after 2008, they were spiking in Afghanistan. But the trajectory is still easily visible. I mentioned this earlier. Iraq casualties by year: http://icasualties.org/ Note the precipitous drop after the surge in 2008. To emphasize the point that the numbers are obscured by the spike in casualties in Afghanistan during those years look here: http://icasualties.org/oef/ Afghanistan was heating up right as Iraq was cooling down, so the casualty counts shifted massively from 2008-2009. The Afghan front may have been boiling over, but by that time Iraq was a relative ghost town as far as the action went.
Here's another thought experiment: What do WE do if ISIS actually blows the Mosul Dam? What if they don't blow it, but simply can't maintain it? What if they use it as an economic or political weapon? What if they cut off water supplies to downriver populations? We spent more than $30 million trying to fix the dam, which the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers called "the most dangerous dam in the world." Just put your imagination in motion here and think of the possibilities... Read the following articles, and ponder those questions. http://online.wsj.com/articles/mosul-dams-takeover-by-isis-raises-risk-of-flooding-1407799954 http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/08/08/this-is-what-could-happen-if-the-islamic-state-destroys-the-mosul-dam/ http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-11/islamic-state-funds-caliphate-with-mosul-dam-as-terror-spreads.html We didn't panic when they took Fallujah. We didn't panic when they took Mosul. You think our government cares about the Yazidis? No one knew who they were a week ago. We haven't really worried about the Kurds for a long time. We panicked when the a$$holes took this dam. Please read and understand why.
I don't think there's any logical argument that for certain if the U.S. remained in Iraq, ISIS wouldn't have grown strong in Syria regardless. It might have led to more American deaths - that's for sure. But the current crisis isn't because the U.S. left, it's because the Iraqi leadership is so corrupt it couldn't unite its own people to defend against a threat. The mistake I see is supporting Malaki.
I think the mistake you're making is equating casualties with winning. That would be true in a conventional sort of war - but not necessarily in a war of ideology. I would again point to Hamas as an example. Just because there are periods where Hamas isn't firing rockets and Israeli casualties are down doesn't mean Israel is any closer to winning the battle. Ideological warriors happily bide their time and go through periods where direct confrontation isn't their strategy - but it doesn't necessarily mean it won't be later. I'm not sure we can say the opposition in Iraq was being being defeated due to the US presence - direct confrontation just wasn't their ideal strategy given a formidable, well-trained military opposing them.
Good lord, how I remember the weekly casualty reports during Vietnam. Every Thursday they'd give an accounting of estimated enemy dead and wounded, and American casualties. This would be duly reported by Walter Cronkite and Huntley-Brinkley on their respective national news programs at 5:30pm. Over the years, there began to be a sense of unreality about it all. It was terrible. At the beginning of the war, the general public was optimistic. The number of American dead and wounded wasn't all that bad, unless you were a family member of one of them, or a friend. As the numbers grew, people started to become confused, perplexed, these were in the main draftees, after all. The numbers grew and people began to hear bad news about folks they knew. Parents began to become very concerned about their children getting drafted to fight in a war they found increasingly difficult to understand. Young people of draft age felt much the same way, and unlike their parents, who had gone through WWII and/or Korea and at least had some idea of what was happening, if not why, they didn't feel connected to this conflict. It didn't make sense to them. And the weekly casualty reports continued to be reported, week after week after week.
That is nonsense. I point out the drop in casualties because 1) it reflects the change in the strategic situation that went on during the period, and 2) to point out that it matters what baseline you're using. Iraq in 2006 was a *completely* different environment than Iraq in 2010. Do you not understand that this matters? People are asking about the wisdom of keeping troops there, and it matters what sort of environment you're talking about keeping them in. You're not stupid enough to not get that, so stop being disingenuous about it. And you have no clue what was actually happening on the ground there during that period. Do you think those thousands of AQI monsters that showed up in my compound all jest went out one night and got drunk and woke up in Bucca the next day? The US Army and the USMC put them there through direct action. And the ones that didn't make it there ended up six feet under - which was quite a few of them. It is not a coincidence that as soon as we left they regained their presence again. It was 95% US putting the pressure on them; the Iraqis just didn't have the capabilities necessary to put them away. And once we left and Maliki turned on the Sunnis - again, literally within a week of us leaving - the dynamic that produced a hostile operating environment for AQI (and subseq
oops, snip... (and subsequently ISIS) evaporated. The stage was set for them to rebound, and no one was left who had the capability to really go after them.
I find it odd that no one here wants to address the only important question asked in this thread so far: What are we going to do now? I have my ideas, but I'd like to hear some suggestions from the herd first. I am particularly interested in libtard solutions; I am curious how they will match against operational realities. I think that ISIS is an enemy that is so evil and so barbaric that there is potential for us to actually agree on something. Alas, I know that is likely a high hope, but... We wingnuts can dream, can't we? So let's hear it. Let's hear your plan. What are we going to do now?
For those who are still a bit unsure about what we are facing now, here is another of VICE's excellent series on ISIS: [youtube]cGQwTOsh__0[/youtube]
