US expected to shelve Euro missile defense plan

and i said you were wrong.

terse enough for you?

 

Lol haha. Fair enough.

 

He just gave you GW's Bush's precise words as you requested.

 

Lmao so true!

 

If you answer the simple question, you'll find out. Why are you so afraid to answer it?

 

Awesome move. I don't understand why it is so bad to try to not piss off Russia. Russia is awesome.

Are we really scared of Russia sending missles somewhere anyways? Doubt it.

 

Recommended reading from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (a Republican):

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/20/opinion/20gates.html?_r=1&ref=opinion&pagewanted=all

September 20, 2009
Op-Ed Contributor

A Better Missile Defense for a Safer Europe

By ROBERT M. GATES

THE future of missile defense in Europe is secure. This reality is contrary to what some critics have alleged about President Obama’s proposed shift in America’s missile-defense plans on the continent — and it is important to understand how and why.

First, to be clear, there is now no strategic missile defense in Europe. In December 2006, just days after becoming secretary of defense, I recommended to President George W. Bush that the United States place 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and an advanced radar in the Czech Republic. This system was designed to identify and destroy up to about five long-range missiles potentially armed with nuclear warheads fired from the Middle East — the greatest and most likely danger being from Iran. At the time, it was the best plan based on the technology and threat assessment available.

That plan would have put the radar and interceptors in Central Europe by 2015 at the earliest. Delays in the Polish and Czech ratification process extended that schedule by at least two years. Which is to say, under the previous program, there would have been no missile-defense system able to protect against Iranian missiles until at least 2017 — and likely much later.

Last week, President Obama — on my recommendation and with the advice of his national-security team and the unanimous support of our senior military leadership — decided to discard that plan in favor of a vastly more suitable approach. In the first phase, to be completed by 2011, we will deploy proven, sea-based SM-3 interceptor missiles — weapons that are growing in capability — in the areas where we see the greatest threat to Europe.

The second phase, which will become operational around 2015, will involve putting upgraded SM-3s on the ground in Southern and Central Europe. All told, every phase of this plan will include scores of SM-3 missiles, as opposed to the old plan of just 10 ground-based interceptors. This will be a far more effective defense should an enemy fire many missiles simultaneously — the kind of attack most likely to occur as Iran continues to build and deploy numerous short- and medium-range weapons. At the same time, plans to defend virtually all of Europe and enhance the missile defense of the United States will continue on about the same schedule as the earlier plan as we build this system over time, creating an increasingly greater zone of protection.

Steady technological advances in our missile defense program — from kill vehicles to the abilities to network radars and sensors — give us confidence in this plan. The SM-3 has had eight successful tests since 2007, and we will continue to develop it to give it the capacity to intercept long-range missiles like ICBMs. It is now more than able to deal with the threat from multiple short- and medium-range missiles — a very real threat to our allies and some 80,000 American troops based in Europe that was not addressed by the previous plan. Even so, our military will continue research and development on a two-stage ground-based interceptor, the kind that was planned to be put in Poland, as a back-up.

Moreover, a fixed radar site like the one previously envisioned for the Czech Republic would be far less adaptable than the airborne, space- and ground-based sensors we now plan to use. These systems provide much more accurate data, offer more early warning and tracking options, and have stronger networking capacity — a key factor in any system that relies on partner countries. This system can also better use radars that are already operating across the globe, like updated cold war-era installations, our newer arrays based on high-powered X-band radar, allied systems and possibly even Russian radars.

One criticism of this plan is that we are relying too much on new intelligence holding that Iran is focusing more on short- and medium-range weapons and not progressing on intercontinental missiles. Having spent most of my career at the C.I.A., I am all too familiar with the pitfalls of over-reliance on intelligence assessments that can become outdated. As Gen. James Cartwright, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said a few days ago, we would be surprised if the assessments did not change because “the enemy gets a vote.”

The new approach to European missile defense actually provides us with greater flexibility to adapt as new threats develop and old ones recede. For example, the new proposal provides some antimissile capacity very soon — a hedge against Iran’s managing to field missiles much earlier than had been previously predicted. The old plan offered nothing for almost a decade.

Those who say we are scrapping missile defense in Europe are either misinformed or misrepresenting what we are doing. This shift has even been distorted as some sort of concession to Russia, which has fiercely opposed the old plan. Russia’s attitude and possible reaction played no part in my recommendation to the president on this issue. Of course, considering Russia’s past hostility toward American missile defense in Europe, if Russia’s leaders embrace this plan, then that will be an unexpected — and welcome — change of policy on their part. But in any case the facts are clear: American missile defense on the continent will continue, and not just in Central Europe, the most likely location for future SM-3 sites, but, we hope, in other NATO countries as well.

This proposal is, simply put, a better way forward — as was recognized by Prime Minister Donald Tusk of Poland when he called it “a chance for strengthening Europe’s security.” It is a very real manifestation of our continued commitment to our NATO allies in Europe — iron-clad proof that the United States believes that the alliance must remain firm.

I am often characterized as “pragmatic.” I believe this is a very pragmatic proposal. I have found since taking this post that when it comes to missile defense, some hold a view bordering on theology that regards any change of plans or any cancellation of a program as abandonment or even breaking faith. I encountered this in the debate over the Defense Department’s budget for the fiscal year 2010 when I ended three programs: the airborne laser, the multiple-kill vehicle and the kinetic energy interceptor. All were plainly unworkable, prohibitively expensive and could never be practically deployed — but had nonetheless acquired a devoted following.

I have been a strong supporter of missile defense ever since President Ronald Reagan first proposed it in 1983. But I want to have real capacity as soon as possible, and to take maximum advantage of new technologies to combat future threats.

The bottom line is that there will be American missile defense in Europe to protect our troops there and our NATO allies. The new proposal provides needed capacity years earlier than the original plan, and will provide even more robust protection against longer-range threats on about the same timeline as the previous program. We are strengthening — not scrapping — missile defense in Europe.

Robert M. Gates is the secretary of defense.

 

I think there are multiple things on different levels to consider in this decision. It's an excellent call to use proven anti-missile technology developed for the Navy to counter the missiles Iran has now. Frankly, I don't understand why Gates, an intelligent man, and his people didn't push this idea during Bush's time in office. The decision to do so is a bit late, but the Obama administration is acting quickly to implement it.

One of the other aspects to this (the ten anti-intercontinental missiles placed in Poland, a rediculous number, IMO, with the attendant radar system in the Czech Republic. a defense system that never worked worth a damn) was an ardent desire, IMO, of the Polish and Czech governments to tie themselves more closely with NATO and the West. Does anyone blame them? Having a missile defense installation on their soil, with "permanent" deployment of US military personel, was seen as a guarantee against future possible Russian coercion and/or aggression.

Given Putin's penchant for throwing his weight around, threatening to cut off the Ukraine's gas supply several times (and during so more than once) for political reasons, regardless of the impact on the rest of Europe by the subsequent disruption of supplies, the invasion of smaller neighbors, actively supporting groups hoping to dismember said neighbors, supporting dissidents, and not just in Georgia, is certainly cause for the former occupied Soviet states to be nervous. This decision appeared to catch them by surprise. It could have been handled better, IMO, but it is still early days in the Obama administration and they'll learn from this. Putting the new system in those countries should have been announced at the same time as the cancellation of the old, the fact that it will happen sooner than the old system, and after telling the respective governments what was going to happen in full detail. My impression is that it didn't play out that way. Again, the administration will learn from how this was handled. I could be wrong and all this was done perfectly. That's not my impression.

And I'm still wondering about placing radar systems, and possibly missiles, in Turkey and/or "the Caucasus." Turkey hasn't proven to be the most reliable of defense partners lately. She has shown herself to be more than willing to do what she wants, regardless of what her allies think. See Cypress. See letting our military cross her borders to invade Iraq from the north. And where else in the Caucasus would you place these systems? I can't think of a country more "reliable" than Turkey. Not a huge deal, but details that we don't know.

basso, my "expounding" has nothing to do with you. I'm giving my own opinions and attempting to give the reasons behind those opinions, or as much as I'm willing to type at the moment with two fingers. You might try it sometimes... you know, supporting your opinions with more than, pardon me, the crap you generally put out. I'm not that good at it, but at least I try.

 

i would never infer that anything you expound upon has anything to do with me, but i hope you don't mind if, just this once, i reiterate that i concur with your post.

 

I sincerely hope something comes from this that has a positive (read "no atomic weapons") impact on Iran's leadership. However, Medvedev is a figurehead. I don't know if he's saying what Putin believes, or what Putin wants the world to believe. Russia has done plenty to make any attempt at making sanctions work an impossibilty, not that sanctions usually work anyway. Still, if they had a chance to work, Putin makes it a hopeless exercise. If this is a real change in Russian/Putin policy re Iran, that would be a big deal. I won't hold my breath, but we'll see.

 

fairly even-handed discussion of this issue at the economist this week. what stands out (to me) is that the existing system could have been kept, and supplemented by Aegis based systems, and provided a more effective overall defense, for the same money. also, the idea that the US is going to place ship-based systems in the black sea, is pure fantasy. set aside for a moment whether the russians would allow such a thing (even if the treaty were amended), where do they go when the going gets hot? it would be akin to suggesting the russians deploy missile interceptors in lake michigan-

...good luck ever getting home comrade...

[rquoter]WHEN a blue-painted Sejjil missile streaked into the Persian skies in May, to calls of “Allahu Akbar” (God is Great) from Iranian officials looking on, the world’s weapons experts took notice. It was Iran’s first successful test of a medium-range missile using solid fuel. Such rockets can be fired at short notice, from mobile launchers, or stored in silos. The older, liquid-fuelled kind are more fiddly: they need filling up shortly before launch. Just as startling was that the Sejjil, with a range of 2,000km (1,240 miles), had two “stages” fired in succession for extra thrust. In February Iran launched a small satellite into orbit. This suggests that Iran is mastering the multi-stage technology needed for scarier missiles.

Many weapons experts now think that the clerical regime’s missile (and nuclear) capability is advancing fast. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president, said the Sejjil gave Iran the power to “send to hell” any military base from which “a bullet” could be fired against his country.

Yet a new American intelligence assessment downplays Iran’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability. It highlights, for reasons that are still secret, a sharper threat from shorter-range missiles that can hit American forces and allies in the Middle East and Europe.

So on September 17th Barack Obama’s administration abruptly abandoned previous plans for a powerful missile-defence radar in the Czech Republic and ten interceptors in Poland. Instead, it will deploy smaller radars closer to Iran on land and on Aegis missile-tracking ships. These would be armed with the less potent Standard Missile 3 (SM-3). As the kit becomes more powerful, initial inkspots of protection would grow, covering all of Europe by about 2018 (see maps).



Mr Obama calls the new system “stronger, smarter and swifter”. Russia’s fierce objections to George Bush’s plans had nothing to do with the decision to scrap them, says the administration. It plays down any quid pro quo, such as possible Russian help on sanctions against Iran—though Mr Obama could not conceal his glee when Russia’s president, Dimitry Medvedev, told the un this week that though sanctions rarely worked, they were “in some cases inevitable”.

But Czech and Polish politicians feel abandoned. They pushed for the scheme in the face of Russian threats and sceptical public opinion at home. They hoped that a permanent American military presence in their countries meant a stronger commitment to defend their territory than the paper guarantee offered by NATO. To make up for that disappointment, Poland wants Patriot air-defence batteries (fully armed, and not just for training) as well as perhaps the deployment of American F-16 fighters.

Ever since Ronald Reagan launched his “Star Wars” programme, missile defence has been a polarising issue in American politics. Robert Gates, the defence secretary, calls it bordering on theology. Critics said missile defence was a futile quest; any country able to build long-range missiles and nuclear warheads would have the skill to devise countermeasures. Contradictorily, critics also argued that the shield would upset Russia and the nuclear balance. Another cavil was that if a country like Iran did build a nuclear bomb, it might smuggle it in, say, an anonymous shipping container rather than using a missile that would have an obvious return address and invite retaliation.

Nevertheless, the Bush administration vigorously pursued missile defence, withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. In addition to two interceptor sites in Alaska and California, it sought a third site in Europe for Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI); some mockingly called these “George Bush Interceptors”. The European system was optimised to hit Iranian ICBMs aimed at America. US-based interceptors would be a back-up. It was sold to Europeans on the ground that it would defend them too.

But the Bush administration accepted that the GBI would not protect south-eastern Europe. This could be addressed by “fill-in” systems, such as Aegis ships, or by a NATO-developed area defence. Under Mr Obama, this fill-in system has become the priority. To protect areas closer to Iran, Mr Obama has pushed back the option of taking two shots at putative Iranian ICBMs until at least 2020, when updated versions of the SM-3 might be able to hit them.

But will the new system be as good at defending Europe? Mr Gates now says that the GBI shield he once promoted is inadequate. Fixed radar and interceptor sites would be vulnerable to pre-emptive attack. And with just ten interceptors, the system would soon be overwhelmed by more than a handful of missiles; America would then, officials say, have to decide whether to sacrifice Europe in order to have enough missiles to defend itself.

Aegis ships, by contrast, can each carry about a hundred SM-3 missiles. These could also be placed on land-based mobile launchers. And instead of having a big fixed radar, smaller mobile sensors would be deployed on land, on ships, in space, on drones and even blimps, all linked together by powerful networks. Such a system would be harder to destroy and easier to deploy to hotspots, and easier to beef up in a crisis. The SM-3 system has so far performed better in tests than the GBI, downing a wayward satellite last year.

Yet questions surround Mr Obama’s plans. Having ships permanently on station is costly. Even with an updated version (the Block IB update of the SM-3 missile, now due to be introduced in 2015), seven ships deployed in European waters could provide only patchwork protection. Maintaining it permanently would need more than the 18 Aegis ships that America now has. In a crisis, ship-based defences could “surge” only temporarily.

The more powerful Block IIA version of the missile, expected in 2018, should mean that Europe can be protected from just three locations. But a study by the Congressional Budget Office in February reckoned that placing these on ships would cost almost twice as much as the GBI system. A favoured site would be the Black Sea, but the 1936 Montreux Convention limits foreign warships’ presence there.

The Pentagon says it wants to deploy at least some SM-3 interceptors on land bases from about 2015, which would be cheaper. But this could run into the same political problems that dogged the GBI. Favoured options include Turkey and central Europe. Officials have promised the bruised Poles and Czechs “first refusal” to host these missiles; but would they risk it again? The Pentagon also talks of deploying a mobile tracking radar in “the Caucasus”. The most likely location is Georgia. But Russia loathes Georgia’s ties with America.

Given the uncertainty over still-untested future versions of the SM-3, Mr Gates says the Pentagon will continue developing the GBI as a hedge. Some ask why he bothered to scrap the original scheme in the first place. The combination of the GBI system with the other defences would have been a powerful way to deal with both present and future threats. Pentagon officials say that limited budgets mean they had to choose between systems. But it is hard to avoid concluding that dumping GBI was, in part, a gesture to Russia.

The smaller SM-3 system should, on the face of it, address the Kremlin’s claim (derided by the Pentagon) that the GBI could weaken Russia’s nuclear deterrent or be turned into offensive missiles carrying nuclear warheads. Losing the Czech radar reduces America’s ability to snoop deeply into Russia. The Obama administration is renewing Bush-era attempts to engage Russia in joint missile defence.

In spite of Mr Medvedev’s words at the UN, Russia’s response to the new policy has been mixed. Vladimir Putin, the prime minister, said he expected more concessions. The chief of Russia’s general staff, General Nikolai Makarov, noted that the anti-missile shield had only been modified not scrapped. If America’s missile defences do evolve into the networked, flexible and globally deployable system that Mr Obama is seeking, western officials say, Russia may yet loathe it more than the hated “George Bush Interceptors”.[/rquoter]

 

Thank goodness Obama's plans regarding missile defense and Iran turned out to be just right. This kind of maneuver enabled us to have Russia join in putting pressure on Iran, and lo and behold the UN inspectors are going to be allowed in to inspect IRan's previously semi-secret nuclear sight.

The smart strategy by Obama and his administration on foreign policy seems to already be paying off. Just to think a few people foolishly lambasted the decision.

Luckily they didn't get their way.