Article below explain why crack down has always failed in the region, so what's different this time. Interesting. (great article pointing out the history of the region, why crackdown has failed, what's different this time, and what are the pitfalls... ) https://www.lawfareblog.com/bukele-...s-gangs—-now-how-and-what-does-it-mean-region How has Bukele been able to escape this pattern? The key is not the crackdown itself, but what came before it: a covert pact. In 2019, Bukele began negotiating an agreement between his government and the leaders of the country’s three main criminal organizations: Mara Salvatrucha, Barrio 18 Revolucionarios, and Barrio 18 Sureños. The gang leaders vowed to keep violence in check and, in exchange, asked Bukele to improve prison conditions and resist extradition requests, among other concessions. There is evidence that at least one gang leader was freed during this period without completing his sentence. (Salvadoran gang leaders have long operated from behind bars.) This pact had two crucial consequences for how the gangs responded once Bukele declared war on them. First, the pact misled gang members into thinking that any form of government repression would be temporary. In April 2020, and then again in November 2021, gang members went on sudden killing sprees, blatantly violating the terms of the pact. On both occasions, Bukele responded by vowing to defeat the gangs, ordering the military to use lethal force, and publishing viral pictures of incarcerated gang members. But, on both occasions, the crackdowns were as brief as the massacres that had triggered them. The gangs did not fight back, and, within days, the government returned to the negotiating table. The pact thus established a clear pattern: The government would crack down only if the gangs used violence first, and these crackdowns would be brief as long as the gangs did not retaliate. In March 2022, when gang members went on a third killing spree, they had little reason to believe things would be any different. In response to this latest round of killings, Bukele ordered the army onto the streets, conducted mass arrests, and declared war on the gangs as he had done at least twice before. As on those occasions, the gangs expected the crackdown to subside if they did not retaliate. So, the gangs did not fight fire with fire. This miscalculation gave the government a critical window of opportunity to cripple the criminal groups. By the time it became clear that Bukele did not intend to return to the negotiating table, the gangs were severely weakened and in disarray. Bukele’s pact had taught the gangs not to fight back. Now, they were left with no choice but to hide. The pact also shaped the gangs’ response to Bukele’s crackdown by driving a wedge between gang leaders and their rank-and-file members. Gang leaders almost always reaped the lion’s share of the pact’s benefits: better prison conditions, protection from extradition, and in some cases even the promise of early release from prison. Meanwhile, the rank-and-file members had to shoulder the bulk of the pact’s costs: They were prevented from using violence to do business or settle scores, and they faced repression from the government whenever violence did break out. The result was a growing divide between leaders and foot soldiers: “Supposedly, the ranflas [national leaders] looked after the wellbeing of their soldiers,” a gang member told El Faro. “Not anymore. … These crazy guys negotiated after their own interests.” This presented gang leaders with a challenge: How could they enforce a pact that alienated many among the rank-and-file members—and from behind bars, no less? Their answer: Concentrate power and squash new leaders. “They refused to appoint substitutes,” the gang member told El Faro. Much like a corporation with no middle management, El Salvador’s gangs became increasingly dependent on a handful of leaders at the very top. This tactic had crucial consequences once Bukele’s crackdown began. Many of the strategies that criminal groups use to adapt in the face of repression—expanding, diversifying, forming alliances—require leadership and coordination. Even the simple act of fighting back may require top-down leadership, especially when the rank-and-file has internalized norms of discipline and obedience. Concentrating power under a small group of national leaders therefore might have increased the gangs’ ability to respond to the crackdown—if these leaders had not been behind bars. Instead, once the crackdown began, the government was able to cut off the gangs’ chain of command by simply isolating key leaders from the rank-and-file. And, because the pact had dissuaded these top commanders from appointing surrogates or local leaders to prominent positions, no one was able to easily step into the vacuum they left behind. Once Bukele’s war broke out, then, the gangs found themselves hamstrung, leaderless, and in disarray. The pact decimated the gangs’ ability to fight back in the absence of their key leaders, giving the state a decisive upper hand. ... One concern is that the gangs are not truly dismantled and are simply biding their time as they reorganize and perhaps even maneuver for a new deal. This scenario is not completely out of the question, especially if the Salvadoran defense minister’s estimate that 30,000 gang members are still in the streets is accurate. But a year is a long time for a large and complex criminal organization to hide not only from the state but also from journalists, international observers, and the thousands of Salvadorans who have answered interviews and public opinion surveys in the past 12 months. A second concern is that the gangs have left behind a vacuum that can be filled by other criminal groups. The region’s major drug cartels, for example, have, for the most part, been conspicuously absent from El Salvador, even as they have extended their reach into neighboring Guatemala and Honduras. One possible explanation is that major cartels viewed El Salvador’s gangs as unreliable business partners: Faced with a choice between allying with these gangs or conquering them, cartels preferred to set up shop elsewhere. But, if Bukele has indeed managed to wipe the gangs off the map, cartels may now see an opportunity to establish a stronghold in El Salvador. A third concern is that El Salvador has not permanently solved its organized crime problem because the conditions that allowed organized crime to thrive in the first place—including poverty and inequality—have not been addressed. El Salvador’s gangs ballooned, in part, because they were able to recruit tens of thousands of young Salvadorans, many of whom saw the promise of opportunity, status, and belonging in these groups. Until conditions improve and all Salvadorans can find those things elsewhere, a gang resurgence will remain a concern. It is impossible to definitively rule out any of these scenarios. Whether they come to pass could depend on what Bukele does moving forward. Continuing to extend the state of exception and maintaining a strong military presence in the streets could keep resurgent gangs, as well as new criminal groups, at bay. But doing so indefinitely could be costly. Especially as Salvadorans become accustomed to relative safety, they may begin to chafe at the crackdown. They may, in time, begin to see the state less as a savior and more as an intruder. Over a long enough period, the crackdown could become unsustainable. For now, however, Bukele seems likely to stay the course until at least February 2024, when he is up for reelection. ...
conti... But massive human rights violations would be only the beginning. Throwing democratic institutions away in an emergency is easy; recovering them once the crisis has passed can be much harder. On this front, Peru provides a striking cautionary tale. In the early 1990s, the government of President Alberto Fujimori—an anti-establishment populist like Bukele—faced a growing guerrilla insurgency. Much like Bukele, Fujimori responded to this security threat by subverting democratic institutions and concentrating power under the executive: On April 5, 1992, Fujimori staged an auto-golpe (or “self-coup”), closing the Congress, shutting down the judicial system, and sending the military onto the streets. As in El Salvador, most Peruvians, in part eager to see decisive action in the face of rising insecurity, applauded these anti-democratic measures. And many Peruvians continued to support Fujimori even as evidence of the state’s widespread human rights violations mounted. But this blank check didn’t just help Fujimori fight the insurgency: It enabled him to establish a corrupt autocratic regime that outlived the guerrillas. Over the next decade, Fujimori abused state institutions to intimidate, bribe, and co-opt all those who could oppose him. He used this increasingly autocratic grip on the state to secure reelection in 1995 and then again in 2000. And he embezzled millions from the government’s coffers throughout. By the time he was forced to resign, Fujimori had secured his place on Forbes’s list of the 10 most corrupt leaders of all time—alongside the likes of Ferdinand Marcos, Slobodan Milosevic, and Mohamed Suharto. The Peruvian case offers a bleak preview of what could lie ahead for El Salvador—and a clear warning for those who hope to emulate Bukele’s example. To follow in the Salvadoran president’s footsteps is to descend down an authoritarian path from which there may be no easy escape.
The needs of the many Outweigh the needs of the few @Xerobull I have And will always be Your friend Jim Your name is Jim
The only people that think he has gone too far are the hardcore supporters of the former political parties, the only people that are saying he can become a dictator are the corrupt former political parties and again their few supporters. Western leftist media is also spreading the dictatorship talk but Bukele is far from it. Its virtually unseen by today's standards that a politician actually stands by his promises and achieves so many goals from his campaign, he has pretty much done so much more than anyone expected. When I was heading back to the U.S the driver said "If the only thing Bukele would have done was get rid of the gang members I would be forever grateful" and that's pretty much most of the people's views. He has far exceeded expectations and has done more than anyone could have hoped for. Yes gangs were bad in ways that are even hard to describe, MS13 is as brutal if not more than the Mexican cartels. These people had no respect for life, had no respect for anything. I can't feel sorry for mass murderers, put them all in prison and throw away the key.
Conservatives are further showing how much they love a strong authoritarian police state...... Not too surprising someone from the Turkish region supports that.
Proud, its incredible that instead of getting praise he gets scolded by woke media for going after criminals. I mean, does it have to be this complicated? Less criminals on the street = less crime.....
Wrong, Bukele declared a war on the cartels. The gang members are now dead or in prison where they belong and now there is an influx of tourism and financial growth in the country. Sorry you love crime, go to Portland or San Francisco so you can enjoy the full crime riddled experience.
I’m surprised these idiots weren’t pissed at miss Nicaragua as well for winning Miss Universe 2023 because she looked dam.n hot as a real woman.
I was trying to be fair but honestly, its not a might... Its a "Bukele will overwhelmingly win in a landslide" and the liberal media will complain....
He won last night with 85% of the votes and then proceeded to deliver one of the best speeches I have ever heard while slamming mainstream media, health and other useless world organizations. Dude took shots at all the dumb ass wokes who are complaining the murderers in El Salvador are suffering in prison. Same woke people that are pro Hamas..... Hopefully the speech is subtitled or translated soon. It was insane...
Honestly, if it can happen in Central America, it can happen anywhere- Nicaragua has steadily improved (still has government issues and arbitrary enforcement of laws but the crime rate has improved profoundly) Even better situation in El Salvador which was once the subject of movies about gangs, militias and crime but you see the turnaround - this is proof things can get turned around with the right leadership. hopefully we get better leadership not only at the federal level (where Biden is a walking dead joke with nonexistent cognitive abilities without a team to keep him upright) - but also at the state and local level where criminals often have more rights than businesses or law abiding citizens
The world hasn't gone insane, people in struggling countries understand that chicken is food. They don't have the time or money to invest in their preferred diet that just so happens to be based off of feelings and political correctness. People in struggling countries understand that crime is socially unacceptable, that to stop crime you have to remove those committing it. Who determines crime? The government, the law makers. Who enforces the law? The police enforces the law and who keeps the criminals away? The government appointed judges. The only way that crime runs ramped is if the government is not enforcing the laws that were put in place to keep the people who elected the government safe. Struggling countries understand that naturally there are two genders, they don't have time to wake up one day and feel feminine or masculine and based off of their emotions decide they want to change their sex. Life is hard, money needs to be on the table by the end of the day. No time for bs, you move forward or get left behind. Mainstream media can't tell these people their children are gay, they will immediately get shut down... Why? Becuase people understand there is no time for emotional bs when you have to survive and make ends meat for your family and for your children to grow up and be decent human beings. Here in the U.S, problems have been created that don't exist, issue that were never issues before. The real question thou is why.....
