[Official] Censorship from governmental actors thread

"Banning ‘critical race theory’ would be bad for conservatives, too":

https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/06/30/racism-academic-discussions-pennsylvania-law/

Banning ‘critical race theory’ would be bad for conservatives, too
A proposed Pennsylvania law goes especially far in constraining academic freedom

By Keith E. Whittington
Keith E. Whittington, a professor of politics at Princeton University, is chair of the academic committee of the Academic Freedom Alliance.
June 30, 2021 at 6:00 a.m. EDT

Bills aimed at directing how race is taught in public schools and colleges are sweeping through Republican statehouses across the country. Regardless of what you think of current trends in pedagogy involving race, these bills are likely to infringe on academic freedom. Moreover, the proposals seem to be getting worse, not better. A bill recently introduced in the Pennsylvania legislature goes further than many others in trying to ban so much as the discussion of any “racist or sexist concept” in public elementary schools, high schools and colleges. That would hamstring the ability to talk about numerous issues, regardless of the teacher’s perspective.

After the murder of George Floyd, a bright spotlight has been trained on issues of race in America. A burgeoning industry of diversity, equity and inclusion consulting, workshops and training already existed in the United States, and these endeavors have only spread further. Debates continue about whether such training has any effect — and whether it promulgates thinking that is itself racist (overgeneralizing about “White” and “Black” traits, for instance). Some schools and colleges are intensifying their efforts to teach about such concepts as “White privilege” and systemic racism — though it is far from clear that such instruction is pervasive in ordinary public schools. Regardless, it is evident that a struggle is underway with far-reaching implications for how race is discussed and taught in America in the future.

In response, some politicians are trying a quick legislative fix to what they see as a growing problem in American education: an overly negative depiction of the United States and its history. But like most quick fixes, this one is going to do more harm than good.

Let us set aside the unhelpful debate over whether what is at issue is something called “critical race theory.” Proponents and opponents of these bills have often talked past one another by shifting the boundaries of what belongs under the label. The important point is that there are controversial conceptual and empirical claims that some would like to incorporate into the public-school curriculum and that others would like to exclude. It matters not what they are called.

We should also distinguish two quite different issues. Whether there are bad ideas being rolled out in schools is one issue. Whether these bills are an effective, appropriate or helpful means for addressing that potential problem is a completely different issue. I have no doubt that there are many pernicious ideas and modes of teaching abroad in the land. Nonetheless, bills like the one proposed in Pennsylvania are the wrong tools for the job.

The Pennsylvania bill would prohibit the use of any public funds in state universities, not to mention primary and secondary schools, to “express” or “publish” any “racist or sexist concept.” No professor can “teach” such concepts, require students to “express” such concepts or “provide a venue” for a speaker who “advocates” such concepts. What is more, no student may be required to “read” or “view” any learning materials that “espouse” such concepts.

The prohibited concepts that cannot be expressed on a college campus and to which students cannot be exposed are quite wide-ranging. Students cannot be asked to read a text that espouses the view that one race or sex is superior to another; that an individual should receive favorable treatment because of the individual’s race or sex; that individuals should not be treated without regard to their race or sex; that merit-based systems are racist or sexist; or that the United States is “fundamentally racist or sexist.”

It is possible to largely share the legislators’ value judgments about these ideas while recognizing that trying to silence those who would disagree is patently unconstitutional. Professors employed at public universities have a constitutional right to teach doctrines with which politicians disagree, and speakers have a right to use generally available public facilities (such as a rented auditorium on a university campus) to promote their views.

Even if such a bill were to survive constitutional scrutiny — which seems doubtful — it would be a bad idea. To take such a prohibition seriously would do real damage to the scholarly effort to understand the world and communicate that understanding to students and other scholars. The legislation would significantly hamper, for example, the ability of a legal scholar to mount an argument in defense of affirmative action in university admissions (because such an argument might include the claim that disfavored groups deserve distinctive treatment). It would stymie the ability of a social scientist to examine the workings of the labor market and racial outcomes (because empirical studies might reveal how apparently merit-based decisions nonetheless create racial disparities). It would obstruct the ability of a philosopher to examine the argument for racial reparations (in which long-standing racist practices in the United States feature prominently) or the psychologist to explore the sources of racist attitudes and behaviors (because such examination might show that an individual is consciously or unconsciously racist).

Consider, too, what it would mean to take seriously the idea that no assigned texts may “espouse” racist views. The bill could make it unlawful for instructors to assign their students to read certain writings of Thomas Jefferson or Abraham Lincoln, to read works of literature by Mark Twain or William Faulkner. It would make it unlawful to read certain opinions by the Supreme Court (such as Dred Scott (1857), which held that Black Americans could not be full citizens) or laws passed by American legislatures (such as the post-Civil War “Black Codes” that spurred the adoption of the 14th Amendment). The bill would prohibit professors from assigning students to read the arguments made by politicians and polemicists across U.S. history defending slavery, advocating for Southern secession or encouraging racial segregation. It would shield students from confronting the historical reality of debates about race in America and, as a consequence, would impede their ability to understand the struggles that we have had and the progress that we have made.

The simple fact is that bills like the one being advanced by Pennsylvania Republicans would subvert the central mission of American universities. We expect college professors and students to be able to read, discuss, confront and dissect controversial, difficult and even repellent ideas. We expect scholars to be able to examine issues surrounding race, just like other controversial topics, and pursue their inquiries wherever they might lead without fear of political censorship. They might not always do a good job of grappling with those difficult ideas, but laws are rarely a helpful solution to that problem. Legal measures like this one are a blunt instrument that will make education worse rather than better, even if you share the political ideals that these proposals are supposed to advance.

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technically this isn't censorship but rather compelled speech. Still comes under the First Amendment rubric. Probably deserves its own compelled speech thread

Assignments Aimed at "Requiring a Statement" of Ideological Belief from Students May Violate First Amendment

https://reason.com/volokh/2021/06/3...ef-from-students-may-violate-first-amendment/

excerpt:

The case is Oliver v. Arnold, decided yesterday by the Fifth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge James L. Dennis joined by Judges Jack Weiner. I expect the opinion will be an important precedent in much of the litigation about compelled "diversity, equity, and inclusion" assignments in public schools. The fundamental precedent on which the case relies, W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette (1943), broadly forbade "compulsion of students to declare a belief,"and condemned all attempts "to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end thought essential to their time and country." Though the case involved a compelled flag salute and pledge of allegiance, its rationale went well beyond the particular patriotic expressions that were being compelled.

The key question will be where the line is drawn between (1) commonplace and presumably constitutional assignments aimed at encouraging students to believe the particular facts and modes of analysis being taught (whether in biology class, economics class, history class, or what have you), and requiring them to show that they've learned the material, and (2) forbidden assignments created "with the impermissible motive of requiring a statement of patriotism [or other ideological belief] from … students." Such a line can, I think, be drawn, but it will take more litigation to establish it.
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more at the link

 

"Boris Johnson's Britain Leans Into Nanny State Food Policies":

https://reason.com/2021/07/03/boris-johnsons-britain-leans-into-nanny-state-food-policies/

Boris Johnson's Britain Leans Into Nanny State Food Policies
New marketing restrictions on junk food will affect bottom lines, not waist lines.
BAYLEN LINNEKIN | 7.3.2021 8:30 AM

Last week, British authorities announced they would ban internet and television advertisements for so-called "junk food" before 9 p.m., beginning in 2023. The ban targets many foods that are high in salt, fat, or sugar, including chocolate, ice cream, soda, breakfast cereals, and pizza.

The government of Prime Minister Boris Johnson says the plan is intended to combat childhood obesity.

"To meet our ambition to halve childhood obesity by 2030, it is imperative we reduce children's exposure to products high in fat, salt[,] and sugar (HFSS) advertising on TV and online," the government said in a statement last week.

This is a cynical move that will have no impact on obesity—not by 2030, not by 2040, and not even by 2525.

To state the obvious, no child has ever become obese after watching advertisements for food—just as no adult has ever later crashed their car because they saw Jake from State Farm on their television. If it were advertising that provided children (or adults) with salt, fat, sugar, and various other vitamins, minerals, nutrients, and calories, then marketing would replace eating as human sustenance. That hasn't happened.

What actually happens—apologies for stating what may seem obvious, but clearly is not obvious to everyone—is that parents and/or guardians 1) buy food that kids eat, and/or 2) give kids money to buy food. Kids don't choose what foods they eat. Adults choose what kids eat by buying that food. That's it. That's the tweet.

Now, do kids ask, beg, cajole, and hound the adults in their lives to buy so-called junk food? Absolutely! And do some adults give in to all that whining and cajoling? Of course! But does that mean the government should step in to play the role of that child's parent or guardian? Hell no! It's up to these parents to parent. To say no. To explain why certain foods are special treats and others are ones kids can and should eat every day. To create healthy habits that kids can build on as they become teens and adults.

Even if marketing bans accomplished their goals—they haven't, don't, and won't—this British one would still fail. That's because, as Politico reports, the Great British Advertising Ban contains a number of loopholes. For one, it only applies to paid advertisements—and not, for example, a food company's social media account(s). Furthermore, the ban exempts small businesses, ads on radio and podcasts, and ads for so-called junk foods that don't visually show any of said junk food. So-called "healthy foods" that are high in fat, salt, and/or sugar—including honey, olive oil, and avocados—are also exempt from the ban, The Hill reports.

I'm hardly the only critic of Britain's food-marketing ban. Noel Yaxley, writing at The Article, says the ad ban will hurt food companies and news outlets alike at a time when they're still trying to emerge from the economic destruction wrought by the pandemic and related restrictions.

A leading British digital marketing spokesperson agrees.

"I could write a whole piece picking apart the lack of evidence behind this tokenistic ad ban and how it represents a completely missed opportunity to address the root causes of childhood obesity," Jon Mew wrote in a piece for Adweek. "Or the fact that the ban is built on an assumption that isn't correct—that a linear relationship can be drawn between seconds of online HFSS ad exposure and calories consumed."

As I wrote in a column early last year on the implications of Brexit, Britain's exit from the European Union (E.U.) would put long standing British complaints about the European nanny state to a real test. With Britain no longer subject to E.U. regulations, I wondered whether it would embrace freer markets in food or just choose to craft its own oppressive food rules. Last summer, I was already lamenting the fact that Johnson had embraced nanny state food restrictions after recovering from a severe case of Covid-19, which in Johnson's case was likely worsened by his obesity. (Johnson subsequently lost weight thanks to "early-morning runs and fewer carbohydrates," not by restricting food marketing.)

I wondered then if post-Brexit Britain would become "a beacon of free trade and prosperity" or if it would instead "ramp up its nannying ways." Sadly, I think we have our answer.​

 

Comedian Sentenced to Prison for “Public Insult of an Antisemitic Nature”
https://jonathanturley.org/2021/07/...n-for-public-insult-of-an-antisemitic-nature/

 

"New wave of anti-protest laws may infringe on religious freedoms for Indigenous people":

https://theconversation.com/new-wav...ligious-freedoms-for-indigenous-people-160733

 

h/t @Commodore

 

https://reason.com/volokh/2021/07/16/250-day-fine-for-displaying-****-biden-sign-at-home/

$250/Day Fine for Displaying "**** Biden" Sign at Home

EUGENE VOLOKH | 7.16.2021 5:10 PM
https://d2eehagpk5cl65.cloudfront.net/img/q60/uploads/2021/07/****BidenSigns.jpg
Credit: NJ.com story

NJ.com (Rebecca Panico) reports (and includes the photo above):

Roselle Park Municipal Court Judge Gary Bundy ordered the Willow Avenue homeowner to remove the signs with profanity within a week or face a $250-a-day fine….

"This is not a case about politics. It is a case, pure and simple, about language," Bundy said. "This ordinance does not restrict political speech. Neither this town or its laws may abridge or eliminate Ms. Dilascio's freedom of speech. However, freedom of speech is not simply an absolute right. It is clear from state law and statutes that we cannot simply put up the umbrella of the First Amendment and say everything and anything is protected speech." …

The ordinance prohibits displaying "any obscene material, communication or performance or other article or item which is obscene within the Borough." It defines obscenity as material that depicts or describes sexual conduct or lacks any serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
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But Cohen's wearing his "**** the Draft" jacket was protected speech, and it's hard for me to see how the signs here are anything but. To quote Justice Harlan's opinion in Cohen,

First, the principle contended for by the State seems inherently boundless. How is one to distinguish this from any other offensive word? Surely the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us. Yet no readily ascertainable general principle exists for stopping short of that result were we to affirm the judgment below. For, while the particular four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.

Additionally, we cannot overlook the fact, because it is well illustrated by the episode involved here, that much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message sought to be communicated. Indeed, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said, "[o]ne of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures—and that means not only informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation."

Finally, and in the same vein, we cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views. We have been able, as noted above, to discern little social benefit that might result from running the risk of opening the door to such grave results.

It is, in sum, our judgment that, absent a more particularized and compelling reason for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple public display here involved of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense.
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On top of that, if the news story is correct that the defendant was being prosecuted solely under the "obscenity" ordinance, that ordinance just doesn't apply here: It defines "obscene" using the normal legal definition, rather than the lay definition that often covers vulgar words. Under that definition, the speech must basically be pornographic, appealing to the "prurient interest" in sex and depicting or describing sexual conduct; the word "****" here doesn't qualify; to quote Cohen again,

Whatever else may be necessary to give rise to the States' broader power to prohibit obscene expression, such expression must be, in some significant way, erotic. It cannot plausibly be maintained that this vulgar allusion to the Selective Service System [or, in this case, to President Biden -EV] would conjure up such psychic stimulation in anyone likely to be confronted with Cohen's crudely defaced jacket.​