Several weeks ago an old friend and I had a conversation/arguement about Iraq that, in light of Paul O'Neill's allegations that the Bush team had been angling for Saddam's overthrow from the get-go, seems particularly relevant now. My friend, who is almost as republican as I am, used to work as an intelligence analyst at the state department. His specialty was arms control, and he participated in the many of the negotiations for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. He left State several years ago, and now works on wall street, but he still has contacts there. Some of them have told him that the Bush team manipulated the intelligence on Iraq to suit their desired outcome, ie an excuse to go to war. In the intelligence community each department (DIA, State, NSA, CIA) has its own agenda and spin on whatever the issue may be. There is significant rivarly between the services (my friend was denied a job w/ the CIA because he'd dropped acid in college, but State gave him the same clearance and didn't seem to care), with state having a reputation for more caution than some of the others. The accusation from my friend's former collegues is that the Bush team chose to ignore intelligence that didn't fit their plans, and emphasized intelligence that painted a worse-case scenario w/ regards to WMDs. There's a lot of other reporting that seems to paint the same picture, an Administration looking for any excuse to oust Saddam. My position is/was that most of the intelligence had been around for years, and was put together by the US and by inspectors on the ground, and corraborated by Saddam's actions (ie Halabja). I thought that State was probably institutionally biased against agressive action, and resentful of the influence of the neo-cons at DOD. One thought seemd particularly important. Even if you accept that Cheney, Rummsfeld, Wolfowitz, et al had a pre-conceived plan for a radical remaking of the mid-east and lied about it, at some point in the fall of 2002 Powell climbed on board. While there are aspects of Powell's performance in Washington over the past 15 years that I might quibble with he's always struck me as a man of principle and unimpeachable integrity. He's often described as the most respected man in Washington. By the time of his presentation to the UN in February 2003 he was clearly of the opinion that Saddam needed to be removed. Since Powell had access to all the intelligence (he would've seen much more than O'Neill) and could form his own opinion, what brought him on board? Was it just, as he said, that the potential threat of terrorists with WMD was not acceptable in a "post-9/11 environment." Was Powell somehow coopted by the neo-cons? Would Powell sacrifice his reputation to lie for George W. Bush? This last seems exceedingly unlikely to me, which leads me to suspect that there's still much we do not know about the search for WMDs.
The best answer I can give is the same one his former assistant gave when his jaw dropped watching Powell cite 'evidence' the assistant knew to be inaccurate ( and knew powell knew) before the UN...that he had finally succumbed to the ( apparently pretty severe and very constant) pressure from the pentagon, Cheney et al to 'be the good soldier', and get in line with the program. His assistant, who was, I believe, a long time Republican and with no partisan need to 'spin' this said that was his only interpretation of Powell's actions, and he knew all that was going on behind the scenes... I used to be very, very high on Powell, and am still very impressed by his abilities and resume...but this is, frankly, a pretty huge black mark on his record. Yes, there is an obligation to authority, and yes, as a career soldier, he is probably more prone to responding in that fashion than most...but in a position like SOS, with the power and prestige that entails, there is also a responsibility to the American people, and the globe in general and when making a case for war, and addressing the UN, there is a responsibility to the truth. I think we established which on gets priority back in Nuremberg... BTW, while I obviously don't agree with your way of interpreting what this information means, I do appreciate your honesty in revealing stuff which seems to contradict your position, no sarcasm meant at all.
(CBS) In the run-up to the war in Iraq, one moment seemed to be a turning point: the day Secretary of State Colin Powell went to the United Nations to make the case for the invasion. Millions of people watched as he laid out the evidence and reached a damning conclusion -- that Saddam Hussein was in possession of weapons of mass destruction. Correspondent Scott Pelley has an interview with Greg Thielmann, a former expert on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Thielmann, a foreign-service officer for 25 years, now says that key evidence in the speech was misrepresented and the public was deceived. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- “I had a couple of initial reactions. Then I had a more mature reaction,” says Thielmann, commenting on Powell's presentation to the United Nations. “I think my conclusion now is that it's probably one of the low points in his long, distinguished service to the nation.” Thielmann's last job at the State Department was director of the Office of Strategic Proliferation and Military Affairs, which was responsible for analyzing the Iraqi weapons threat for Secretary Powell. He and his staff had the highest security clearances, and everything – whether it came into the CIA or the Defense Department – came through his office. Thielmann was admired at the State Department. One high-ranking official called him honorable, knowledgeable, and very experienced. Thielmann, too, had planned to retire just four months before Powell’s big moment at the U.N. On Feb. 5, 2003, Secretary Powell presented evidence against Saddam to the U.N., and the speech represented a change in Powell’s thinking. Before 9/11, he said Saddam had “not developed any significant capability in weapons of mass destruction.” But two years later, he warned that Saddam had stockpiled those very weapons. “The gravity of this moment is matched by the gravity of the threat that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction pose to the world,” said Powell. At the time of Powell's speech, Thielmann says that Iraq didn't pose an imminent threat to anyone: “I think it didn't even constitute an imminent threat to its neighbors at the time we went to war.” But Thielmann also says that he believes the decision to go to war was made first, and then the intelligence was interpreted to fit that conclusion. For example, he points to the evidence behind Powell’s charge that Iraq was importing aluminum tubes to use in a program to build nuclear weapons. Powell said: “Saddam Hussein is determined to get his hands on a nuclear bomb. He is so determined that he has made repeated covert attempts to acquire high-specification aluminum tubes from 11 different countries even after inspections resumed.” “This is one of the most disturbing parts of Secretary Powell's speech for us,” says Thielmann. Intelligence agents intercepted the tubes in 2001, and the CIA said they were parts for a centrifuge to enrich uranium - fuel for an atom bomb. But Thielmann wasn’t so sure. Experts at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the scientists who enriched uranium for American bombs, advised that the tubes were all wrong for a bomb program. At about the same time, Thielmann’s office was working on another explanation. It turned out the tubes' dimensions perfectly matched an Iraqi conventional rocket. “The aluminum was exactly, I think, what the Iraqis wanted for artillery,” recalls Thielmann, who says he sent that word up to the Secretary of State months before. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Houston Wood was a consultant who worked on the Oak Ridge analysis of the tubes. He watched Powell’s speech, too. “I guess I was angry, that’s the best way to describe my emotions. I was angry at that,” says Wood, who is among the world’s authorities on uranium enrichment by centrifuge. He found the tubes couldn’t be what the CIA thought they were. They were too heavy, three times too thick and certain to leak. Months later, Thielmann reported to Secretary Powell’s office that they were confident the tubes were not for a nuclear program. Then, about a year later, when the administration was building a case for war, the tubes were resurrected on the front page of The New York Times. “I thought when I read that there must be some other tubes that people were talking about. I just was flabbergasted that people were still pushing that those might be centrifuges,” says Wood, who reached his conclusion back in 2001. “It didn’t make any sense to me.” The New York Times reported that senior administration officials insisted the tubes were for an atom-bomb program. “Science was not pushing this forward. Scientists had made their determination their evaluation and now we didn’t know what was happening,” says Wood. In his U.N. speech, Secretary Powell acknowledged there was disagreement about the tubes, but he said most experts agreed with the nuclear theory. “There is controversy about what these tubes are for. Most U.S. experts think they are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium,” said Powell. “Most experts are located at Oak Ridge and that was not the position there,” says Wood, who claims he doesn’t know anyone in academia or foreign government who would disagree with his appraisal. “I don’t know a single one anywhere.” -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Thielmann says the nuclear case was filled with half-truths. So why would the Secretary take the information that Thielmann’s intelligence bureau had developed and turn it on its head? “I can only assume that he was doing it to loyally support the President of the United States and build the strongest possible case for arguing that there was no alternative to the use of military force,” says Thielmann. That was a case the president himself was making only eight days before Secretary Powell’s speech. It was a State of the Union address that turned out to be too strong: “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear-weapons production.” After the war, the White House said the African uranium claim was false and shouldn’t have been in the address. But at the time, it was part of a campaign that painted the intelligence as irrefutable. “There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us,” said Cheney. But if there was no doubt in public, Thielmann says there was plenty of doubt in the intelligence community. He says the administration took murky information out of the gray area and made it black and white. Powell said: “My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we are giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence." Solid intelligence, Powell said, that proved Saddam had amassed chemical and biological weapons: “Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical-weapons agent. That’s enough to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets.” He also said part of the stockpile was clearly in these bunkers: “The four that are in red squares represent active chemical munitions bunkers. How do I know that, how can I say that? Let me give you a closer look.” Up close, Powell said you could see a truck for cleaning up chemical spills, a signature for a chemical bunker: “It’s a decontamination vehicle in case something goes wrong.” But Thielmann disagreed with Powell's statement: “My understanding is that these particular vehicles were simply fire trucks. You cannot really describe as being a unique signature.” -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Satellite photos were also notoriously misleading, according to Steve Allinson, a U.N. inspector in Iraq in the months leading up to war. Was there ever a time when American satellite intelligence provided Allinson with something that was truly useful? “No. No, not to me. Not on inspections that I participated in,” says Allinson, whose team was sent to find decontamination vehicles that turned out to be fire trucks. Another time, a satellite spotted what they thought were trucks used for biological weapons. “We were told we were going to the site to look for refrigerated trucks specifically linked to biological agents,” says Allinson. “We found 7 or 8 of them I think in total. And they had cobwebs in them. Some samples were taken and nothing was found.” Allinson watched Powell’s speech in Iraq with a dozen U.N. inspectors. There was great anticipation in the room. Like waiting for the Super Bowl, they always suspected the U.S. was holding back its most damning evidence for this moment. What was the reaction among the inspectors as they watched the speech? “Various people would laugh at various times because the information he was presenting was just, you know, didn't mean anything, had no meaning,” says Allinson. And what did he and the other inspectors say when Secretary Powell finished the speech? “They have nothing,” says Allinson. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- If Allinson doubted the satellite evidence, Thielmann watched with worry as Secretary Powell told the Security Council that human intelligence provided conclusive proof. Thielmann says that many of the human sources were defectors who came forward with an ax to grind. But how reliable was the defector information they received? “I guess I would say, frequently we got bad information,” says Thielmann. Some of it came from defectors supplied by the Iraqi National Congress, the leading exile group headed by Ahmed Chalabi. “You had the Iraqi National Congress with a clear motive for presenting the worst possible picture of what was happening in Iraq to the American government,” says Thielmann. That may have been the case with Adnan Sayeed Haideiri, whose information was provided by the Iraqi National Congress to the U.S. Government and The New York Times. He appeared on CBS News. Haideiri said he was a civil engineer and claimed to have visited many secret weapon-production sites. The government thought he was so valuable they put him in a witness protection program. The White House listed him first in its Web page on Iraqi weapons. “He was basically an epoxy painter,” says David Albright, a physicist who has investigated defectors for his work with the U.N. Albright studied a transcript of Haideiri’s claims: “If you read a transcript of an interview that he went through, he has no knowledge of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.” What did they find from Haideri's information? Nothing, says Albright. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- But there was a good deal more in Secretary Powell’s speech that bothered the analysts. Powell claimed Saddam still had a few dozen Scud missiles. “I wondered what he was talking about,” says Thielmann. “We did not have evidence that the Iraqis had those missiles, pure and simple.” Powell warned that empty chemical warheads found recently by the U.N. could be the tip of the iceberg. “They were shells left over from the Gulf War. Or prior to the Gulf War, from their past programs,” says Allinson. Powell, however, made several points that turned out to be right. Among them, he was right when he said Iraqi labs were removing computer hard drives; he was right that Iraq had drawings for a new long-range missile; and he was right about Saddam’s murder of thousands of Iraqi citizens. But, an interim report by coalition inspectors says that so far, there is no evidence of a uranium enrichment program, no chemical weapons, no biological weapons, and no Scud missiles. The State Department told 60 Minutes II that Secretary Powell would not be available for an interview. But this month, he said the jury on Iraq is still out: “So I think one has to look at the whole report. Have we found a factory or a plant or a warehouse full of chemical rounds? No, not yet but there is much more work to be done.” Powell added that Iraq was a danger to the world, but the people could judge how clear and present a danger it was. As for Greg Thielmann, he told 60 Minutes II that he’s a reluctant witness. His decision to speak developed over time, and he says the president’s address worried him because he knew the African uranium story was false. He said he watched Secretary Powell’s speech with disappointment because, up until then, he had seen Powell bringing what he called “reason” to the administration’s inner circle. Today, Thielmann believes the decision to go to war was made -- and the intelligence was interpreted to fit that conclusion. “There’s plenty of blame to go around. The main problem was that the senior administration officials have what I call faith-based intelligence. They knew what they wanted the intelligence to show,” says Thielmann. “They were really blind and deaf to any kind of countervailing information the intelligence community would produce. I would assign some blame to the intelligence community, and most of the blame to the senior administration officials.” The administration wants to spend several hundred million dollars more to continue the search for evidence. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- After turning down repeated requests for an interview by 60 Minutes II, Colin Powell spoke to the BBC Wednesday afternoon about Thielmann's claim that he misinformed the nation during his February U.N. speech. "That's nonsense. I don't think I used the word 'imminent' in my presentation on the 5th of February. I presented, on the 5th of February not something I pulled out of the air. I presented the considered judgment of the intelligence community of the United States of America -- the coordinated judgment of the intelligence community of the United States of America," said Powell, according to a transcript of the interview released by the State Department. "The investigation continues. There is an individual, I guess, who is going on a television show to say I misled the American people. I don't mislead the American people and I never would. I presented the best information that our intelligence community had to offer." When the BBC interviewer pointed out that Thielmann was considered the leading expert for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in his department, Powell replied: "I have many experts in my department, and there are many differences of opinion, among any group of experts. And it's quite easy for a television program to get this individual and then they complain. But to try to turn it around and say that 'Secretary Powell made this all up and presented it, knowing it was false,' is simply inaccurate." Powell again refuted the charges in an Oct. 16 interview with National Public Radio. "It wasn't hyped. It wasn't overblown," said Powell, in a transcript released by the State Department. "I would not do that to the American people, nor would I do that before the Security Council, as a representative of the American people and of the President of the United States."
I was thinking the same thing. Nice post, basso. Wow... I just saw MacBeth's response to your question, basso. Damn, MacBeth, that didn't take long! Powell has really disappointed me as well. I would have strongly considered voting for him if he had run instead of Bush against Gore. I also, along with a lot of people, thought he would be a moderating influence on the Bush Administration. If he is, I can only wonder how far to the right and how terrible a foreign policy this administration would have if he wasn't there. I find it hard to believe that he has had much influence at all. Powell seems marginalized to the point of irrelevance.
Greg Thielmann was actually my friend's boss and was the source of his information cited in my post. Apparently this is "his issue," and while he doesn't believe Powell "lied" he does think he saw what he wanted to see. I'll accept that, I suppose, but my question is why? If this is true, what's in it for Powell?
He addresed that, didn't he? What Powell sees as loyalty to his President, ie being a good soldier. Think of the timing here...Powell's apparent turnaround comes after Bush goes public about the WMD 'facts' and 'evidence'...and this after we know that Powell has been trying to be the moderating voice in the WH, has been engaged in a pretty heavy and constant battle with the less moderate wing of the administration lead by Cheney, Rummy, et al. So after the President puts his weight and words behind the militant side in a public forum, what are powell's alternatives? Disagree before the UN, the world, and the electorate, which a career soldier would likely see as disloyalty to the man who gave you your job, or play the good soldier, and try and see things the way the President has chosen to see them. He wouldn't really have any other choice, just those two. In his position, with his profile, there would be no way to 'silently object', especially given his itinerary following bush's speeches citing intel, WMD, 9-11, etc. His was the role of representing the White houses' agenda to the world at large...any deviation from the established path would have been tantamount to publicly saying his boss was lying.
exactly, and if he had he would've undercut Bush's case entirely and made it exceedingly unlikely that the US would've invaded Iraq. of course he would've had to resign, but remember the Powell Doctrine? Formed from his experience in Vietnam, one aspect of it was to only fight with overwhelming force, and with the will to win. another was to only go to war when circumstances demanded it, and with the support of the american people. I just can't believe that Powell would've signed off on placing american soldiers in harm's way, and sacrificed a core principle, if he didn't really believe what he was saying. it doesn't fit with everything else we know about the man.
But you're assuming that one principle wouldn't conflict with another; loyalty. As a man of principle, Powell would have been forced to breach one of these two values...or, as Thielman sees it, according to you, try and circumvent one of them by 'choosing' to see things in a new way, thereby 'believing' in the needed case for war, and being able to maintain loyalty. Also, apply your own point...Unless Powell chooses to try and sabotage Bush's plan to go to war...assuming he could...and as such be, in a soldier's view, incredibly disloyal to his CO...this means we're going to war. Any deviation from him, with the war as a given, would mean we're going to war without a unified front, and possibly without the ability to generate an overwhelming force, both at home and abroad. Assume for a moment that Powell either A) Prioritized loyalty to his superiors above other moral contraints, or B) believes that the WH has decided on war and he could not actually STOP it, any action on his part to contradict their position would only serve to... * Lessen the likelyhood that other nations support the war, thereby inevitbily resulting in a higher price to pay in US soldier lives. * Provide a fractured support system at home for a war abroad...eerily similar to the latter day VietNam experience that Powell lived through and vowed to never see again. Again, the cost would be in US lives, power, and prestige...and accomplish what, point 2 being a given. * Send a message throughout the armed forces...wherein he is highly respected...that a subbordinate's first duty is not to follow orders, but to decide if he agrees with them...which if you know anything about the military C.O.C., would be incredibly damaging. I rahter suspect that, as we know, Powell fought the good fight behind closed doors, but when the decision had been made,played the good soldier in public. Remember, two, that he is ( if I remember correctly) not coming back for a second term as SOS...
I'd like to think that the principle of saving the lives of american soldiers would override any qualms he would've had about contradicting his commander in chief. if he knew the claims were false and called W on it he would've been hailed as a national and international hero. W is such a divisive figure and powell is so respected that there's no way Bush could've garned the support needed to actually go to war if powell had called him out. there's a lot of speculation about powell's future, but as they remarked on brit hume's show the other night, the job's his as long as he wants it.
If you read Bob Woodward's <I>Bush At War</I>, you get some neat insight into the workings of Bush/Cheney/Powell/Tenet/Rumsfeld/Rice in the months following 9/11. He had amazing, unprecedented access for that book, and also did many later interviews with the major players. One thing that comes across with Powell is that he really disagrees with the rest of the administration - especially Cheney and Rumsfeld - quite a bit. But ultimately, whatever the policy Bush decides on, he supports fully. Now, in this case, he didn't have to do anything unethical to support that position, but he does play the role of the loyal soldier.
You wouldn't think very highly of him at all if you read his history. He's a establishment man though and through, without a single bone in his spinal column. MacBeth, do a search on : My Lai Colin Powell Iran Contra Colin Powell In his autobiography he admits to giving orders to kill anyone remotely suspicious looking from several hundred meters away from their helo patrols - the suspicious intent - if the person moved after they opened up with the .50 cal right next to the person. I thought that crap in Apocalypse Now was the movies taking liberties with the truth...
Woof... Will do, although my immediate response is that this kind of decision is endemic to unit and field commanders, especially in guerilla style wars. In such engagements the priorities of these on sight decision makers is almost always to prioritize his own men's survival, and as such issues which would normally seem inplausible become fairly commonplace. I am NOT defending the actions in question, merely pointing out that, in general, I do not usually assign specific blame to unit commanders for orders whose entire purpose is to keep his men alive. This is not what is right, but what is common and understandable. It is the knowledge that this is what war involves that leads me to constantly say that " War as a last resort" should not just be a catchphrase, but an actualized policy, and I am more prone to lay the ultimate blame for actions like you describe at the feet of the overall commanders and particulary the policy makers and administration which made them, if not necessary, at least inevitable. That is why when people in here and in the country in general were so quick to support a war largely concieved by men who'd never seen one, I was so dissapointed and dismayed. I think it is also worth noting that among those who comprise the WH decision making branch Powell, who has ( I'm pretty certain) by far the most combat experience ( if not the only) was also the one who fought the longest for a diplomatic solution, opposed the quick decision to war, and only, if reports are true, conceded to the war cause out of a sense of duty. I think that many in here who have never seen combat and were as quick to cry havoc might want to think about that...
When they named his successful clone "Batch," I thought it was some sort of laboratory joke, but no...
i guess intelligence is never perfect and the art lies in its interpretation/evaluation. as powell said, and cheney has said as well, 9/11 caused the admin to reevaluate existing intelligence in a new light, so while they may have had contingency plans on how to go after saddam events caused them to decide they couldn't wait and going to war now was a judgement call by the administration. guess i don't see a contradiction here, and this election will be a referendum on whether they were right.
