[PB Prospectus] Houston Rockets Preview

Came across this great preview: http://www.basketballprospectus.com/products/pbp2011/ I included a very long excerpt. It is very thorough, thus i did not include everything because there are simply too many charts and tables. Interesting Notes:

(a) In terms of advanced stats, Lamar Odom is considered a "quasi-star." Looks like Dallas got a steal on the cheap.

(b) Terrence Williams ranked in the 96th-100th percentile in rebounding and 88th-95th percentile in passing at his position (shooting guard).

(c) Kyle Lowry is ranked in the 88th-95th percentile overall at the point guard position. And also, the stats suggest he might have a breakout campaign, as he is projected to have the highest WARP on the rockets this year.

(d) Kevin Martin is in the 96th-100th percentile in offense at his position, yet he is in the 4th-11th percentile in defense. Basically, his defense renders him neutral.

(e) The article suggested that the rockets should consider selling high on Scola and Lee since they have already peaked and have value.

(f) Pattrick Patterson's player comparison is a 97.3% match to Rasheed Wallace!

Enjoy!

Someday, Daryl Morey may pen the story of his quixotic career-long quest as an NBA general manager to acquire a superstar player. What remains unclear is whether the tale will have a happy ending.

Since joining the Houston Rockets in April 2006, Morey has proven effective at using the league’s most robust analytics department in concert with traditional scouting to find solid contributors, often at bargain prices. This strategy worked well when the Rockets were placing these role players around Yao Ming, and Houston won an average of more than 53 games between 2006-07 and 2008-09. In 2009, the Rockets finally broke through and won a playoff series, advancing for the first time since 1997.

The greatest triumph of the Yao era would also spell its downfall. During a Western Conference Semifinal matchup against the Los Angeles Lakers, the 7-6 center suffered a hairline fracture in his left foot. Yao missed the entire 2009- 10 season because of his foot, and his comeback last year was cut short by a related stress fracture in his left ankle. Last July, Yao gave up hope of returning to the court and announced his retirement.

Without Yao, Houston has found itself in the worst possible place for an NBA franchise: the middle. The Rockets have won 85 games the last two seasons, just enough to keep them out of the top 10 draft picks but not sufficient to reach the playoffs in the competitive Western Conference. Houston’s shortcomings are easy to trace back to Yao’s absence. The Rockets have had to cobble together a rotation at center, their weakest position, and are also missing top-tier talent.

Over the last two seasons, no Houston player has reached a double-digit WARP total. 13 of the 16 teams that reached the playoffs in 2010-11 had such a dominant star. The exceptions were two East teams (Indiana and Philadelphia) that reached the playoffs with worse records than the Rockets, and the Denver Nuggets, who compensated by building the deepest rotation in recent NBA memory.

Morey is well aware of the issue. Long before Yao was lost to injuries, Houston hoped to acquire a superstar to replace Tracy McGrady. The goal was to accumulate enough assets to consolidate in a trade for a star, as the New York Knicks did to acquire Carmelo Anthony during last season. Those opportunities, however, are limited. Of the 22 players in the league with 10-plus WARP in 2010-11, 16 were still with the team that originally drafted them. Just two changed teams in free agency, both last summer (LeBron James and Amar’e Stoudemire). Four players reached their current team via trade (Pau Gasol, Lamar Odom, Zach Randolph and Deron Williams). Of those, Gasol and Williams are the lone examples of the type of trade Morey hopes to make.

The best the Rockets have been able to do was dealing for Kevin Martin before the 2010 trade deadline. In a complex three-team deal with the Knicks and Sacramento Kings, Houston sacrificed the option of going under the cap in the summer of 2010 and gave up forward Carl Landry to get Martin, who was suffering through an injury-plagued season. Healthy last year, Martin played at the same high level as he had previously in Sacramento. Based primarily on his efficient scoring, Martin posted 9.8 WARP. That figure overstates Martin’s value because he is so ineffective at the defensive end of the floor. The Rockets were only marginally better with Martin on the floor last season. He is truly more of a semi-star.

Houston developed another semi-star in the backcourt in 2010-11 in point guard Kyle Lowry, who began the campaign as a backup to established starter Aaron Brooks. When Brooks badly sprained his left ankle early in the season, Lowry seized the starting job. By adding improved three-point shooting to his strong defense and solid playmaking, Lowry was quietly one of the NBA’s better point guards last season. The forgotten Brooks was dealt to Phoenix at the trade deadline for backup Goran Dragic and a first-round pick.

The Rockets’ last trade chip is power forward Luis Scola, the team’s top frontcourt player. Scola, a starter throughout nearly the entirety of his four-year career in Houston, is skilled enough to take advantage of playing a featured role after Yao was sidelined by injury. He’s boosted his per-game averages to borderline All-Star level, albeit without improving his advanced statistics. Scola turned 31 in April, so the Rockets will have to move quickly in order to flip him for value.

Martin and Scola figured prominently in the blockbuster deal Houston nearly swung to acquire Pau Gasol just before the start of training camp. As part of a three-team trade that would have netted the L.A. Lakers Chris Paul, the Rockets were to send Martin, Scola, Dragic and the Knicks’ 2012 first-round pick (originally acquired in the Martin deal) to the Hornets. In return, Houston would have landed one of the NBA’s top 10 players and cleared enough cap space to potentially sign the top free agent on the market, Denver Nuggets center Nenê.

Instead, Morey saw the ball pulled away just as he was about to kick it. The NBA, as owners of the Hornets, blocked the deal. Discussions about altering the swap to make it more palatable to the league broke down, leaving the disappointed Rockets in the same position they were before. In his first public comments after the non-trade, Morey told reporters he was unable to discuss it on the advice of team counsel.

The search for a superstar continues. History shows that the easiest way to add such a player is through the draft. That’s unlikely to happen where Houston is picking. The Rockets have held the 14th pick each of the last two years, taking polished college products Patrick Patterson and Marcus Morris. Morey hoped to move up through the Martin deal, which also gave Houston the right to swap first-round picks with New York in 2011 and the Knicks’ 2012 first-rounder, protected through the top five selections. Because New York used the cap space to sign Amar’e Stoudemire and develop into a playoff team, those picks failed to pan out. Houston had the better first-round pick in 2011, and New York’s 2012 pick figures to be somewhere in the middle of the first round at best.

Having a pair of first-round picks last June did allow Morey to take a risk on a possible solution at center. The Rockets traded up from the 23rd pick to the 20th in order to select 21-year-old Lithuanian center Donatas Motiejunas, who will stay overseas this season. The 7-foot Motiejunas, who prefers to play away from the basket, is early in his development but has a chance to eventually develop into a quality starter in Houston.

The deal on draft night was also part of another Morey strategy that has been unfolding over the last year: collecting failed lottery picks. The “second draft” theory of giving young draft picks a second chance after they washed out with their first team was popularized by ESPN Insider’s John Hollinger years ago, but no one has taken it to the same extremes as the Rockets have specifically with players from the 2009 Draft. Since February 2010, Morey has collected four players from the 2009 Lottery (Jonny Flynn, Jordan Hill, Hasheem Thabeet and Terrence Williams) in the hopes of reaping the potential that made them top-11 picks.

So far, Houston has yet to unearth any starting caliber talent from the group. Hill was an adequate reserve during his first full season with the Rockets, while Williams continued to clash with coaches and rarely got off the bench. Thabeet, the No. 2 overall pick, might be the biggest reclamation project of all. Houston sent him to its D-League affiliate in Rio Grande Valley after picking him up from the Memphis Grizzlies at the deadline for Shane Battier. Flynn, who came from Minnesota as part of the deal for Motiejunas, is the latest addition to the group.

The newfound focus on player development influenced the Rockets’ search for a replacement for head coach Rick Adelman. Adelman and the team mutually agreed to part ways at season’s end, a move that made sense for both parties. Adelman came to Houston to coach a contender, not a team searching for an identity. That Adelman’s goals had diverged from Morey’s was evident at the trade deadline, when he was frustrated to lose veteran starter Shane Battier in the trade that brought Thabeet from the Grizzlies.

After an extensive coaching search, the Rockets settled on former Minnesota Timberwolves vice president of basketball operations and head coach Kevin McHale. While McHale’s tenure in Minnesota is remembered for poor personnel moves that squandered prime years of Kevin Garnett’s career, he was much more successful during two stints on the sidelines as an interim head coach. Both times, the Timberwolves improved their record under McHale (see chart).

In most cases, midseason coaching changes have little effect on team record. Non-playoff teams typically improve their winning percentage by just 2.5 percent after firing a coach. So McHale’s success is notable. His playing experience might be equally relevant to the situation in Houston. McHale possessed one of the most polished repertoires of post-up moves in league history and has a strong reputation for teaching post play and catering to his big men as a coach. Al Jefferson played the best basketball of his career under McHale before suffering a season-ending ACL injury. In Thabeet and eventually Motiejunas, McHale will have a pair of important pupils.

The Rockets will need one of these reclamation projects to pay immediate dividends to avoid a similar fate in 2011-12 as the last two seasons. SCHOENE predicts virtually an exact rerun, with Houston finishing around .500 but out of the Western Conference playoff picture. The Rockets have found the upper bound of what kind of success is possible without a superstar. Unless they can manage to complete a trade like the one that broke down, they will need to find a way to elite talent, and that may require spending a few years in the lottery.

Chase Budinger: The deadline deal that sent Shane Battier to the Memphis Grizzlies made Chase Budinger the Rockets’ starting small forward, and he held his own in the role over the season’s final two months. Houston clearly isn’t done looking for an answer at the position, but for the here and now Budinger appears to hold the job. The Rockets could do worse. Budinger has essentially been a league-average player during his first two seasons and still has room to grow.

Statistically, the best part of Budinger’s season was maintaining an average True Shooting Percentage despitea decline in his three-point accuracy. He did so by getting to the free throw line more frequently and making more of his attempts once there. Budinger’s foul shooting shows his potential as a shooter. Last season saw Houston use Budinger more frequently coming off of screens. Per Synergy Sports, he actually made a better percentage of those shots than spot-up opportunities, though he was less efficient because most of them were long two-pointers. Budinger has proven solid at the defensive end but could put his athleticism to use to improve his rebounding and generate more blocks and steals.

Goran Dragic: Goran Dragic was unable to build on the momentum of his strong 2010-11 season and playoff run, taking anenormous step backward before being dealt to the Rockets for Aaron Brooks in a challenge trade at the deadline.He picked up his play after the deal and finished the year strong as a starter in place of the injured Kyle Lowry. Dragic had double-doubles in the last three games and a triple-double (11 points, 11 rebounds, 11 assists) in the season finale.

Three years into his NBA career, Dragic still needs to slow down and stop trying to do so much. His stint with Houston was the first time he’s used plays at a below-average rate, and it coincided with far and away the best turnover rate he’s ever had. (Dragic turned the ball over so much in Phoenix that his overall turnover rate was still the same as the season before.) It may have helped that the Rockets put him in fewer pick-and-rolls, where he was ineffective as a scorer. When Dragic knocks down three-pointers (something else he improved with Houston), he has posted above-average efficiency. He can find teammates and holds his own defensively. If Dragic can put it together for a full season, he’ll make a case to potentially find a starting job when he hits free agency next summer.

Jordan Hill: Because Houston was so thin in the frontcourt, Jordan Hill got to play more than 1,100 minutes last season. Ifhe fails to show improvement, he will not reach that mark again. Instead of progressing with experience, Hill either made no progress or regressed in every key category. The Rockets were terrible with him on the court, playing 11.5 points worse per 100 possessions according to BasketballValue.com.

In part, Hill is miscast as a center. He can block the occasional shot but lacks the size or instincts to handle the position on a regular basis, which put him in a tough spot defensively. More discouraging is that Hill shot no better from the field than he did as a rookie and turned the ball over more frequently, which hurt his efficiency. Coming out of Arizona, he projected as a quality finisher around the rim. Instead, Hill has been merely league average. Kevin McHale might help him out by involving him in more pick-and-rolls, as he flashes quickly to the basket after setting screens.

Courtney Lee: Courtney Lee just turned 26, but it already looks like he has peaked as a player. His production in three NBA seasons has been virtually identical. There are worse fates, as Lee has firmly established himself as a solid 3/D player, a skill set that should keep him in rotations for years to come.

After a down season, Lee’s three-point percentage bounced back, making up for a decline in his two-point shooting caused by fewer attempts at the rim. Defensively, Lee does a good job of staying in place and denying easy opportunities. Bigger wing players can shoot over him at times, but his defense made for a nice complement to starting shooting guard Kevin Martin. The Rockets will have a decision to make as Lee comes to the end of his rookie contract. He may be overpriced in free agency for his current role as a backup, and Houston could get value for him before the deadline.

Kyle Lowry: It was a breakthrough season for Kyle Lowry, who wrested the starting job from Aaron Brooks and finished ninth among point guards in WARP, ahead of Rajon Rondo and Tony Parker. Lowry’s steady progress as a backup had indicated such a leap was possible, yet it was still stunning just how well Lowry played. At 25, he’s locked up the position in Houston for the foreseeable future.

Three-point shooting is the one area of Lowry’s breakout that appears ripe for regression. He made more triples than in his previous career to date and improved his accuracy from 26.4 percent to 37.6 percent. SCHOENE does see Lowry maintaining most of his development. His improvement as a ballhandler, in both assist rate and turnover rate, looks more sustainable. Lowry has also long been one of the league’s top defenders at the point. He likes to get up into ballhandlers, using his strength and relying on his quickness to keep him from getting beaten off the dribble. Lowry’s height would seem to leave him vulnerable to post-ups, but Synergy Sports’ data placed him 11th among all players at defending the point. In part, that’s explained by the limited number of point guards capable of posting up. It’s also a testament to Lowry’s ability to compete defensively.

Kevin Martin: After two injury-plagued seasons marked by declining statistics, Kevin Martin put together another vintage campaign. The Rockets’ go-to guy, Martin used nearly 30 percent of the team’s plays with an elite True Shooting Percentage. He gets his shots in nearly an ideal manner, statistically. Among players with usage rates better than 25 percent, only Manu Ginobili relied less on two-point attempts than Martin. He combines three-point accuracy with a unique knack for getting to the free throw line.

No coach would ever teach a player to shoot like Martin, who is all elbows. It works for him, however, and helps him exaggerate the contact he does draw. Martin can score in a variety of fashions. He spots up, shoots off the dribble and gets open coming off screens. If basketball was a platoon system, Martin would be one of the league’s top players. Instead, his value is limited by his poor defense. Houston allowed 2.6 more points per 100 possessions with Martin on the floor, and that was his best mark in the last four seasons. Without Shane Battier to handle top shooting guards, Martin could struggle even more defensively this season.

Marcus Morris: Marcus Morris is younger than twin Markieff by seven minutes. Coincidentally, that’s about the same span that separated their selections in the 2011 Draft. In something of an upset, Markieff was taken one pick ahead of Marcus. At Kansas, Marcus was the bigger star, but Markieff posted better advanced statistics and has an easier transition to the NBA than Marcus, who will likely move to the perimeter. He has the athleticism to pull it off, but must improve his outside shooting and his ballhandling after spending most of his time inside in college. The Rockets are hoping the lengthy process results in a more physical complement to Chase Budinger at small forward.

Patrick Patterson: It took Patrick Patterson until mid-December to see game action and he did not crack the rotation for good until March, but that should not be taken as a commentary on his play. When he got the opportunity, Patterson did nothing but produce. At the very least, the Rockets have found a solid reserve option at power forward. Patterson was even more efficient as a scorer than expected, ranking in the league’s top 30 in two-point percentage. Expect that to come down slightly this season, as Patterson is unlikely to continue making nearly half of his shots away from the rim. Still, his strong shot selection figures to ensure he is accurate from the field. Patterson was excellent on the offensive glass and had more difficulty coming up with defensive rebounds as his height worked against him. Height was also an issue defensively, and may ultimately keep Patterson from being a full-time starter.

Luis Scola: 2010-11 saw Luis Scola take on a bigger role in the Houston offense and average a career-high 18.3 points per game. His advanced numbers remained about the same, as Scola sacrificed a little efficiency to use more plays. To his credit, Scola has proven capable of succeeding a variety of different roles with the Rockets, going from being the team’s No. 4 option early in his career to the No. 2 option now without suffering whatsoever. Post-up opportunities have become an increasingly larger part of Scola’s game. He has good footwork down low and can score over defenders with turnarounds and fadeaways.

As Scola has spent more time in the high post, where he’s a capable passer, his offensive rebound rate has suffered. Scola remains better than average on the defensive glass. He is also versatile defensively, where he is comfortable defending in the paint or against stretch fours. Scola’s size, while it rarely translates into blocked shots, is especially useful in the Houston frontcourt.

Hasheem Thabeet: The term “sophomore slump” doesn’t even begin to describe what happened to Hasheem Thabeet last season. Though he was already considered a bust as a rookie, Thabeet put up decent per-minute statistics. He shot a high percentage from the field, was effective on the glass and was one of the league’s top shot blockers. Almost none of that carried over in 2010-11. Thabeet looked like an entirely different player--one who had never played basketball at a high level before.

Thabeet is the Rockets’ biggest reclamation project, both figuratively and literally, and Kevin McHale’s main player development task will be improving Thabeet’s footwork to help him get out of his own way. This season, that process will presumably take place behind the scenes during practice. Any minutes Thabeet can give Houston for now will be a bonus and a positive sign as the Rockets plan for 2012-13.

Terrence Williams: Stop me if you’ve heard this one before. Terrence Williams was a lottery pick in the 2009 Draft who blew his opportunity with his original team and was dealt to Houston at a reduced price. Williams’ problems are twofold. On the court, his poor outside shooting has kept him from harnessing his other skills on a regular basis. Away from the floor, he has been unable to get along with his coaches and has gotten in trouble in both New Jersey and Houston for airing his grievances on Twitter.

Nobody is going to put up with Williams unless he finds a way to post a True Shooting Percentage better than 50 percent. During the second half of his rookie season, he made just enough shots to play heavy minutes and averaged 5.8 rebounds and 4.4 assists after the All-Star break. He’s also got the potential to be an elite defender if he puts his tools to use. But none of that will happen until Williams can make a shot outside 20 feet.

Johnny Flynn: The Rockets unquestionably bought low on Jonny Flynn. Two years removed from being the No. 6 overall pick, Flynn was essentially given away by the Minnesota Timberwolves on draft night. Houston will try to boost Flynn’s stock. There is talent here. Flynn was a lottery pick in what might have been the deepest draft ever for point guards. His style, heavy on dribble penetration, was a terrible match for Kurt Rambis’ triangle offense. Flynn also wasn’t healthy last year after undergoing offseason hip surgery that sidelined him through mid-December and his confidence suffered as a result.

That noted, outside factors cannot explain away Flynn’s horrendous decision making last season. His turnover rate ballooned to more than one in four plays and he inexplicably took a third of his shots from beyond the arc despite shooting just 31.0 percent from deep. The first step for the Rockets coaching staff will be getting Flynn to understand his strengths and weaknesses and adjust accordingly. At 22, he still has time and encouraging comps. The biggest challenge might be finding playing time behind two quality point guards.

 

No problem! Here's Dalembert's entry:

Perhaps the problem with Samuel Dalembert is that he’s always been asked to do too much. Part of that stems from his last contract. He was paid like an elite center, but he’s not one. Though he is elite in certain facets of the game, the total package never came close to justifying the $65 million deal he signed with Philadelphia six years ago. Fans expected a $13 million center. Dalembert is a $5 million center. Is it his fault that he plays a position of scarcity? After finishing out that contract in Sacramento last season, Dalembert hit unrestricted free agency, where he was Plan D in a marketplace that included Dwight Howard, Tyson Chandler and DeAndre Jordan. No matter where Dalembert landed, he was going to be received poorly. So it goes. This time, his salary should be more commensurate with his skills, which aren’t so bad. Dalembert blocks shots at three times the league rate and defends the post well. He’s awkward afoot and doesn’t fare as well when you get him on the move--his metrics are poor against isolations and he’s barely adequate against the pick-and-roll. The real strength of his game is rebounding--he’s one of the best in the NBA on both ends of the floor. On offense, Dalembert has hurt his value by using more plays. He’s become a bit better as a ballhandler, but his weak hands and poor decision making leads to turnovers, another reason he draws fans’ ire. Dalembert will again find a 25-minute role, likely as a starter, for an NBA team this season. In a role that plays to his considerable strengths, there is no reason why he can’t finally find a home where fans are glad to have him.

Also, he is listed as 79th to 87th percentile in defense at the center position and 88th to 95th percentile in rebounding at the center position. Looks like we found a good defensive center on an attractive contract.